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A SYSTEM 
OF NATURAL THEISM 



BYtV 

LEANDER S. KEYSER, D.D. 

PROFESSOR OF THEISM, ETHICS AND CHRISTIAN EVIDENCE IN WITTENBERG 
COLLEGE AND OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY IN HAMMA DIVINITY SCHOOL, 
SPRINGFIELD, OHIO. AUTHOR OF "A SYSTEM OF CHRISTIAN 
ETHICS," "the rational TEST," "A SYSTEM OF CHRIS- 
TIAN EVIDENCE," "election AND CONVERSION," 
"THEOLOGICAL OUTLINES AND THESES," ETC. 



BURLINGTON, IOWA 

THE GERMAN LITERARY BOARD 

1917 



o^ 



^ 



y^K 



Copyright, 1917, by 

E. NEUMANN 
Burlington, iowa 



NOV 20 1917 



vQ'GI,A479141 



FOREWORD 

Primarily this work is intended for a text-book in col- 
leges, theological seminaries, and other schools which may 
arrange for such a discipline in their curricula. For this 
reason the outlines and various divisions of the system are 
made conspicuous by means of numerals, captions, wide 
spaces, and different fonts of type. It is believed that 
this method will prove helpful in a number of ways. It 
will enable the reader and student to get a comprehensive 
view of the whole system and of its several articulations. 
It will aid the instructor in the assignment of lessons and 
the student in his preparation for the class-room. The 
instructor will be able to formulate his questions in a 
pointed and relevant way, which is an essential in doing 
first-rate pedagogical work. A systematic study and mas- 
tery of any subject will also have its value as a mental 
discipline. In this way, too, the student may be led to 
form the habit of making a scientific arrangement of the 
various subjects he desires to investigate. Knowledge 
that is well classified and co-ordinated is the most ser- 
viceable. 

The author also believes that a systematic arrangement 
of material and data will be just as acceptable to the 
general reader who may care to study such a theme as 
scientific Theism. 

Many great and valuable books have been written on 
the subject of Theism, and the author has no criticism 

5 



6 Foreword 

to pass on most of them. However, as an instructor in 
this discipline, he has found that most of these works, 
valuable as they are, have little adaptation for text-book 
purposes, and are often too abstrusely expressed to en- 
lighten the general reader. 

The author is convinced that the positive arguments 
for the divine existence set forth in Part II of this work 
have not been invalidated by any of the latest, well- 
attested discoveries of science, but have rather been cor- 
roborated by them ; and in this respect his views coincide 
with those of many of the most profound recent writers 
on Theism. 

That there is need today of thorough and well-reasoned 
teaching on this subject — and teaching, too, that gives 
forth no uncertain sound — is patent to every one who is 
conversant with present-day college ideals and tendencies. 
Indeed, among all classes of thinkers, whether in college 
or out, there is a call and demand for a clear and positive 
presentation of the theistic proofs. A questionaire re- 
cently sent out by Professor James H. Leuba, of Bryn 
Mawr College, to a large number of the scientists of the 
country elicited the response that a majority of them are 
either agnostical regarding the existence of God, or have 
become actually atheistic. Professor Leuba's book has 
thus been characterized by an acute reviewer : "This is a 
plea, or rather the conclusion of a plea, for atheism, with 
its logical denial of immortality." 

We believe, therefore, that a work like the present one 
is sorely needed — provided, of course, we have been able 
to make the arguments effective and convincing. 
Whether we have succeeded or failed, our motive has 
been an earnest one. It has been to furnish a book for 



Foreword 7 

readers everywhere who may wish to have at hand the 
arguments by which the dangerous tendencies to agnosti- 
cism and materiahsm may be counteracted. The author 
is especially anxious that the book may find its way into 
the curricula of many of the colleges of the country, 
whether Church or State institutions, so that our educated 
youth may be thoroughly grounded in theistic belief, and 
may be saved from plunging into the maelstrom of mate- 
rialistic science. The work might also be used as a sup- 
plementary text or reference book in the department of 
Apologetics in theological seminaries. 

The Author, 
wittenberg college, 
springfield, ohio. 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER PAGE 

I. Introductory Data (Definitions, Terms, etc.) 15 
II. General Argument (for the Divine Exist- 
ence) 28 

III. Teleological Argument 34 

IV. Cosmological Argument 49 

V. Ontological Argument 59 

VI. Moral Argument 64 

VII. Esthetic Argument 76 

VIII. Atheism and Materialism 84 

IX. Deism 90 

X. Pantheism 94 

XI. Idealism 100 

XII. Naturalistic Evolution 108 

XIII. Agnosticism, Positivism, Monism 115 

XIV. The Divine Attributes (Self -existence, Eter- 

nity, etc.) 122 

XV. Thesis on God's Goodness 130 

XVI. The Divine Relations 140 

Index 143 

9 



GENERAL OUTLINE OF THE SYSTEM 
PART I 
Introductory Data 
I. Definition and Terms. 



11. 


General Principles. 


III. 


The Idea of God. 




PART II 




Proofs of the Divine Existence 


I. 


General. 


XL 


Teleological. 


III. 


Cosmological. 


IV. 


Ontological. 


V. 


Moral. 


VI. 


Esthetic. 




PART III 




Anti-Theistic Theories 


I. 


Atheism and Materialism. 


11. 


Deism. 


III. 


Pantheism. 


IV. 


Idealism. 


V. 


Naturalistic Evolution. 


VI. 


Agnosticism, Positivism and Monism. 




11 



12 A System of Natural Theism 

PART IV 
Divine Attributes and Relations 

I. The Divine Attributes. 
II. The Divine Relations. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Most of the books in the following list will prove valu- 
able to the reader who wishes to consult them. The 
author is glad to acknowledge his indebtedness to a num- 
ber of these works, especially in the way of suggestion 
and inspiration. 

Flint: "Theism'* and "Anti-Theistic Theories." 

Harris' "The Rational Basis of Theism." 

Bowne: "Studies in Theism." 

Janet: "Final Causes." 

Martineau: "Studies of Religion," 2 vols. 

Diman' "The Theistic Argument." 

MUller (Max): "Natural Religion." 

Valentine' "Natural Theology" and "Christian Theol- 
ogy," Vol. I. 

Fisher: "The Grounds of Theistic and Christian 
Belief." 

Orr: "The Christian View of God and the World." 

Fraser: "Philosophy of Theism." 

Iverach: "Theism in the Light of Present Science and 
Philosophy ;" "Is God Knowable ?" 

Mead: "Supernatural Revelation," pages 1-64. 

Miley: "Systematic Theology," Vol. I. 



A System of Natural Theism 13 

Beattie: '*A Treatise on Apologetics," Vol. I. 

Everett: "Theism and the Christian Faith." 

Stirling: "Philosophy and Theology." 

Ward: "Naturalism and Agnosticism" and "The Realm 
of Ends." 

Davidson: "Theism as Grounded in Human Nature." 

Schurman' "Belief in God: Its Origin, Nature and 
Basis." 

Sheldon: "Unbelief in the Nineteenth Century." 

Dykes: "The Divine Worker in Creation and Provi- 
dence." 

Keyser: "The Rational Test," Chapter I. 

Lindsay: "Recent Advances in Theistic Philosophy." 

Balfour: "Theism and Humanism" (1915). 

Ward (William Hayes): "What I Believe and Why," 
Chapters I-XH (1915). 

Micou: "Basic Ideas in Religion, or. Apologetic 
Theism" (1916). 



A SYSTEM OF NATURAL THEISM 

PART I 
INTRODUCTORY DATA 



CHAPTER I 

I. DEFINITION AND TERMS 

1. Definition: 

Natural Theism is the science which treats of the exist- 
ence and character of God in the Hght of nature and 
reason. 

2. Terms: 

Our science is known by various designations, namely : 
Natural Theism, Rational Theism, Natural Theology, 
and sometimes simply Theism. 

The term ''Natural Theism" seems to the author to be 
preferable for several reasons: (i) The word "Natural" 
clearly distinguishes our science from Revealed or Bib- 
lical Theism; (2) the word "Theism" is more suitable 
than the word "Theology" for students who do not intend 
to enter a theological seminary; (3) the adjective "Nat- 
ural" is preferred to the adjective "Rational" because 

15 



16 A System of Natural Theism 

the latter might suggest or imply that Christian Theism is 
not rational, whereas we believe the opposite to be true.^ 
The word "Theism" is derived from the Greek: ©cos, 
God. 

11. GENERAL PRINCIPLES 

1. The place o£ reason: 

Reason has its uses and its limitations. Its processes 
should not be contemned. It is obviously a divinely im- 
planted power of the human mind, and it is rational to 
assume that it was intended to be used. Many minds 
also find pleasure in rational processes, and that would be 
an additional evidence that they are to be employed. No 
less true is it that the mind is so constituted that it cannot 
accept anything that seems to it to be incredible and 
irrational. 

On the other hand, the powers of human reason should 
not be over-estimated. There are many problems which 
human intellection has not yet solved, in spite of all its 
endeavors. Among these problems are the following: 
What is matter? What is mind? How are matter and 
mind correlated in the human brain ? What is life ? How 
can the mind cognize objective reality? How can the 
will determine itself in liberty? Mr. Edison declared 
some time ago that, with all his knowledge of the power 
of electricity, he did not yet know whether it is a sub- 
stance or only a force. Therefore, reason should be mod- 
est in pressing its claims ; it should "not think more highly 
of itself than it ought to think." 

I. Even the word "Natural," as used here, should be distinguished thus: 
its opposite is not "unnatural," but "supernatural." Christian Theism de- 
pends mostly on the supernatural revelation, while Natural Theism depends 
solely on the light of nature and reason. 



Introductory Data 17 

In dealing with theistic problems in this work we shall 
use human reason with the foregoing principles ever in 
mind. We think it will be found that most of the 
methods of reasoning employed will lead to proper con- 
clusions ; at least, to those that are more tenable than the 
opposite conclusions would be. Yet we cannot presume 
to think that all our inductions and deductions will be 
convincing to all classes of minds. Perhaps no purely 
rational process can give the human mind absolute assur- 
ance of the existence of God, especially the mind that has 
once been caught in the meshes of atheism. That assur- 
ance doubtless can be obtained only through a clear-cut 
Christian experience. However, with all the limitations 
of our human faculties, we sincerely believe that the 
theistic position can be shown to be more reasonable than 
that of any of the anti-theistic theories. 

2. Marks of God's handiwork i^ 

If there is a God who made and sustains the universe, 
including human beings, it is reasonable to believe that 
we should be able to see marks of His handiwork in the 
creation. He surely would not leave Himself without a 
witness therein. These evidences should appear in the 
realms of both matter and mind. Every human artisan 
leaves such marks upon his handiwork. Why not the 
Divine Artisan? 

3. Man's intuitions and mental processes reliable :' 

In this work the intuitions and general laws of human 
thinking will, for the most part, be regarded as trust- 
worthy. If man's cognitions of objective reality, time, 

2. Cf. Valentine's "Natural Theology," pp. 1-3. 

3. Cf. Valentine, ut supra, pp. 3, 4. 



18 A System of Natural Theism 

space, cause and effect, moral distinctions, logical con- 
clusions, etc., are not in the main reliable, true knowledge 
and science are utterly impossible, and we might as well 
stop before we begin our investigations. However, in 
many places in this work, especially in dealing with 
Idealism, Positivism and Kant's Phenomenalism, we shall 
endeavor to show the rational grounds of our faith in 
the general intuitions and experiences of the human mind. 

4. Theism a science; 

Theism is a true science, and for these reasons: It 
deals with observed and empirical facts, makes proper 
inductions from them, and arranges them in systematic 
order, just as is done in any other branch of science. 
Besides, the data it treats of are just as patent, just as 
outstanding, and just as potent in their influence as are 
the data of any other worthy domain of investigation. 

True, at times a priori methods must be used and philo- 
sophical principles appealed to, but this is true of all the 
sciences, however empirical; for no scientific mind can 
avoid raising philosophical questions. 

5. History and development of our science : 

While there has always been religion among men, cen- 
turies passed before any attempt was made to formulate 
a science of religion. The greatest of the Greek and 
Roman philosophers — Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, 
Seneca — made efforts along this line, in connection with 
their treatment of other philosophic problems. However, 
it is only in modern times that Natural Theism has been 
so developed that it can rightfully take its place among 
the sciences that are worthy of the name. The same may 



Introductory Data 19 

be said of practically all the sciences, whether physical, 
mental, moral or theistic. 

6. Some vital relations o£ Theism: 

(i) To Christian theology: 

This relation is that of a part to the whole; that is, 
Christian theology includes all the light derived from 
nature and reason, and adds to it the clearer light of the 
divine revelation in the Bible. According to the Holy 
Scriptures themselves, the God who revealed His will 
in this special way also "created the heavens and the 
earth" (Gen. i:i), and rules over the universe, and 
reveals His glory therein (Psalm 19:1). Christ, who 
came to redeem mankind, proved Himself master of the 
natural realm as well as of the spiritual. Therefore, it 
is correct to say that Christian Theology includes all the 
data of Natural Theism. 

No doubt all scientific theists in Bible lands are more 
or less influenced by the Christian revelation, whether 
they are distinctly conscious of it or not. As Christianity 
is one of the outstanding facts of the world, it cannot be 
ignored in any system of Theism that professes to be 
scientific. It is a patent fact that the greatest and most 
satisfactory systems of Natural Theism are those that 
have been wrought out by men who accept the Bible as a 
divine revelation. 

(2) To religion: 

Without the doctrine of God — a God who is a personal 
Being — there can be no religion deserving of the title. 
The very idea of religion involves communion with the 
supernatural. Men have attempted to establish a religion 



20 A System of Natural Theism 

on the basis of an impersonal power in the universe 
(Pantheism), or on the worship of Humanity (Positiv- 
ism), but such forms of religion are extremely vague, and 
possess little, if any, practical value, as will be proved 
in subsequent theses. "The doctrine of God is the first 
doctrine of religion." 

(3) To morality: 

The theistic view of the cosmos furnishes the only ade- 
quate ground, sanction and inspiration of true morality. 
The denial of God's existence logically results in the 
negation of moral distinctions ; for if there is no personal 
God back of the universe, why should one thing be right 
and another wrong?* This subject will be elaborated 
in the chapter on the Moral Argument for the divine 
existence. 

(4) To the State: 

Since religion and morality are necessary to the wel- 
fare and perpetuity of the State, Theism lies at the very 
foundation of civic well-being. It is doubtful whether 
a government whose subjects were all atheists could sub- 
sist for any considerable time. At least, no country has 
ever ventured to try the experiment. A professed atheist 
cannot even take an oath in a civil court. Therefore, for 
the sake of the State the young people of our schools and 
colleges should be well grounded in the reasons for the 
theistic view of the world. 

(5) To science and philosophy: 

Theism furnishes the foundation for true science and 
philosophy; for it places back of all observed data and 

4. Goldwin Smith: "The denial of the existence of God and of a future 
state is, in a word, the dethronement of conscience." 



Introductory Data 21 

phenomena an ordering Mind, thus positing a real basis 
for system in science and for ultimate unity in philosophy. 
Without an ordering Intelligence back of all things as the 
Creator and Governor, the universe would have no order 
and system, and so would not be intelligible, and could 
not, therefore, be an object of investigation by the human 
mind. Intelligibleness in the cosmos connotes Intelligence 
as the cause of the cosmos. 

III. THE CONCEPTION OF GOD 

1. Its content: 

There are variable conceptions of God among the peo- 
ple of the earth. They range from the crude, hazy and 
imperfect ideas of pagan people to the clear and correct 
view that God is the Supreme, Absolute and Infinite 
Personality who is the First Cause. 

2. Its genesis: 

(i) A number of erroneous viezvs regarding the rise 
of the idea of God have been advocated from time to 
time. Let us first examine these: 

a. Some persons hold that the idea of God arose from 
superstitious dread of the awful and mysterious in nature. 
This is not an adequate view, for, if it were true, then, 
when superstitious fear is removed by greater knowledge, 
the idea of God would fade away; but, instead of that 
being the result, the conception of God becomes clearer 
and belief in Him more persistent as men advance in 
knowledge of the universe and its wonders. It would be 
gratuitous and childish to hold that the belief of the many 
educated theists of today is primarily due to the supersti- 
tious fears of their primeval ancestors. 



22 A System of Natural Theism 

b. Some unbelievers maintain that the crafty inven- 
tions of priests and kings account for the origin of the 
idea of God. This is an antiquated opinion. No well- 
informed person would hold it now-a-days. If men have 
no natural faculty for religion, how could designing men 
ever obtain so potent an influence over almost the entire 
human family? If there is no God, how could the idea 
of the divine Being arise in the minds even of impostors ? 
Besides, the many intelligent people today who believe in 
God could not be deluded in that way. 

c. Others hold that ancestral reverence gave rise to 
the idea of God. But it has been found that many nations 
who do not worship their forefathers, and never did 
worship them, have positive conceptions of a divine 
Being. Hence this explanation is inadequate. 

d. Traditions of a primitive revelation are regarded 
by some as the origin of the idea of God. This may in 
part explain why most men believe in God, especially if 
the tradition is founded on fact; yet it is not probable 
that mere tradition, in view of its uncertainty, would 
have kept the idea aUve with so much persistency through 
all the ages, if there were not an innate disposition to 
believe in the divine Being. 

e. According to other speculatists, mere intuition or 
innate consciousness adequately accounts for the genesis 
of the God idea. This of itself would not be a sufficient 
explanation, for such an intuition or consciousness must 
itself be accounted for. It could not have come by 
chance, nor could the God idea have evolved without an 
adequate genetical basis and source. 

f . Today some theorists contend that the idea of God 
originated in purely rational processes. This view is con- 



Introductory Data 23 

futed by the patent fact that many primitive people who 
believe in God never could have mastered the profound 
arguments of systematic Theism. Moreover, some pro- 
found philosophers have become very obscure in their 
conceptions of God, while others have landed in agnosti- 
cism and even atheism. 

(2) What, then, may be regarded as the true view 
of the origin of the idea of God? Only that view which 
affords an adequate explanation of all the facts in the 
case can be regarded as scientific: 

a. Man was created in the image of God. Of course, 
this is a proposition that remains to be proved ; but sup- 
posing for the moment that it is a fact, it would ade- 
quately account for man's innate capacity for knowing 
God and his longing for communion with Him. If man 
is not like God in some respects, he could have no idea 
of God, no communion with Him, no vital relation 
to Him. Therefore, man must bear the image of his 
Maker. 

b. There is, in addition, the view of a primitive reve- 
lation. While we do not believe that Natural Theism 
needs to insist on this item, yet, if such a revelation was 
made, it would have so deepened the idea of God in the 
mind of primitive man as to help to account adequately 
for the persistency and universality of the idea. 

c. A study of ethnology proves that man has a natural 
disposition to infer the existence of a Creator and Pre- 
server from the character of the cosmos. This inference 
is almost intuitive, and requires no profound logical proc- 
esses of thought. The only adequate explanation of this 
universal phenomenon is that the capacity for the God 
idea and the disposition to cherish it have been divinely 



24 A System of Natural Theism 

implanted in man's mind. Surely the idea of God never 
could have evolved from a no-idea of God. 

3. Its original form:^ 

(i) Wrong views: 

A number of erroneous views of the original form of 
the theistic idea are held by certain classes of advocates. 
We shall merely mention them here, and define them, 
reserving our reasons for rejecting them to the discussion 
of the true view under (2) below. The erroneous views 
are the following: 

a. Fetichism: 

The worship of natural objects, which are regarded by 
the votaries as possessed by spirits. Animism (from 
anima, soul) is practically the same form of supersti- 
tion. Fetichism is from facticius, which means ''made by 
art," ficticious. 

b. Polytheism: 

The worship of many gods, which are regarded as more 
or less above and distinct from natural objects. Poly- 
theism is from ttoAvs, many, and 0€o?, god. 

c. Henotheism: 

The idea of simply a national or tribal God, but not the 
one and only God of the whole universe. When a nation 
believes that it is presided over by only one God, while 
other nations are ruled by other gods, that nation would 
hold to the henotheistic religion. Henotheism is from 
£1/09, one, and ©to?, God. 

5. For much of this section we are indebted to Valentine's "Natural 
Theology," which is of great value. 



Introductory Data 25 

(2) The true view: 

We believe that the original conception was Mono- 
theism (Greek, ii6vo^, one, and 0€O9, God), the conception 
of one God and only one, who presides over all nations 
and over the whole cosmos. Our reasons for holding 
this view, and rejecting the foregoing views under a, b 
and c are the following : 

a. Psychological reason: 

It would be easier for primitive man to conceive of 
only one God than of many gods. The natural develop- 
ment of the human mind is from one to many, from the 
singular to the plural, from the simple to the complex, 
from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous. All evo- 
lutionists define the process and development of the cos- 
mos in these terms and in this order. This argument 
may not appeal to some persons, because they are apt to 
think of men as they are today ; but let us try to imagine 
the primeval man as the first idea of God arises in his 
mind, and we shall see that his initial conception must 
have been of one God. Afterward the idea of more than 
one God would dawn upon his untutored thought. 

b. Philological reason: 

In most of the principal languages of the world the 
word for God comes from the same root. Many of the 
greatest linguists^ proclaim this view. While it may 
seem to point to nothing more than the unitary origin of 
the human family, yet the idea of one God would agree 
better with the fact of one root-word for God than would 
the idea of a plurality of gods. 

6. Cf. Valentine, ut supra, p. i8. ' 



26 A System of Natural Theism 

c. Historical reason: 

The further back we trace the histories of the chief 
religions, the more nearly do they approach to the doc- 
trine of pure monotheism. This is simply a question of 
fact, not of mere theory and speculation. It is true of 
the religions of Egypt, Babylonia, Persia, India and 
China.*^ History fails to record a single example of a 
nation or tribe that has advanced by its own efforts from 
a state of animism and polytheism to the monotheistic 
conception.* On the ' other hand, history tells us of 
numerous cases of decline and degeneration in religion. 
In this place we appeal to the Bible only as one of the 
historical books of the world, and in it we find first the 
conception of one God, who "created the heavens and 
the earth," whereas afterward arose the tendency to 
degenerate into idolatry or polytheism. "The Book of 
the Dead" is the oldest Egyptian document yet found ; it 
teaches monotheism, while later Egyptian theology has 
its pantheon. All this affords strong proof that the 
original form of the God idea was that of monotheism. 

d. Ethnological reason: 

As has been already indicated, there has been a general 
tendency among the nations which have been unenlight- 

7. Valentine, pp. 19, 20; Max Muller, "Chips from a German Workshop;" 
Renouf: "Hibbert Lectures on the Religion of Ancient Egypt," pp. 92, 93; 
James Legge, "The Religion of China," pp. 11, 16. 

8. Vide James Orr, "The Christian Conception of God and the World," 
pp. 7St 409-412 (the latter reference is very valuable). See also cogent 
statement by Dr. F. P. Ramsay in "The Princeton Theological Review" for 
April, 1917, page 355. Dr. Ramsay says: "There is no known instance of 
monotheism being derived from Polytheism. . . So far as the present 
writer knows, there is not one scintilla of proof of the existence of any 
people whose ancestors were never monotheistic; and monotheism is as old 
as any trustworthy human records." Principal A. M. Fairbairn ("Studies 
in the Philosophy of Religion," p. 12) and Max Muller ("Is Fetichism a 
Primitive Form of Religion?" p. 105) make similar statements. (See Orr, 
ut supra, p. 409.) 



Introductory Data 27 

ened by Christianity to degeneration in religion. The 
progress has been downward instead of upward. This 
fact would point to an original pure form of religion, 
namely, monotheism, while polytheism and fetichism 
would be later decadent and corrupted forms. 



PART II 

PROOFS OF THE DIVINE EXISTENCE 

CHAPTER II 

GENERAL ARGUMENT^ 

I. DEFINITION 

The General Argument is that form of theistic proof 
which is based on the universal belief in God and the 
universal religious instinct. 

II. DIVISIONS 

1. The universal belief in God: 

( I ) History and ethnology prove that all nations have 
a belief in a Supernatural Being or in supernatural beings. 
True, a certain class of scientists once contended that 
tribes had been found in central Africa and Australia 
who had no conception of divine or supernatural beings ; 
but later investigations have disproved their contention. 
Even if such tribes had been found, what would have 

I. In his excellent work, "Natural Theology," Dr. Milton Valentine 
calls the first class of proofs "The Presumptive Arguments," by which he 
means those arguments which, while they do not afford a clearly logical 
demonstration, yet offer a more or less convincing presumption that there is 
a God. However, after a good deal of thought on the subject, we are con- 
vinced that these arguments are quite as convincing as are the other argu- 
ments. In lieu of a better term, therefore, we use the word "General," be- 
cause the proof deals with the general or universal belief in God, etc. The 
last two divisions included by Valentine under the "Presumptive Argument" 
belong more logically elsewhere, and are located in this work in what we 
regard as the proper places, 

28 



General Argument 29 

been their state of civilization? It surely would have 
been of the lowest type. But human beliefs, especially 
those of an exalted and morally potent character, should 
not be gauged by the most degraded forms. Would it 
not be more rational to form our conceptions of the divine 
Being and His existence from the highest forms of civili- 
zation? We do not determine our ideas of science, moral- 
ity and esthetics from the conceptions held by the lowest, 
crudest and basest tribes. Why, then, our ideas of God? 
Besides, such inferior tribes, if actually found, would be 
so exceptional as to prove the rule. However, the best 
results of research thus far lead us to conclude that there 
are no exceptions. 

Objection may be made on the ground that in many 
tribes the conception of God or of gods is extremely 
crude, gross and grotesque. Very true ; but still the idea 
is present, and in most positive form. Pagan nations 
have crude ideas of other important facts and realities, 
such as would come under the head of physical science, 
civil government and moral distinctions. We must also 
admit that perhaps our own conceptions of the Deky 
fall far below the wonderful and glorious reality. 

Some scholars regard Buddhism as an exception to the 
general belief in God or gods. They maintain that it is 
atheistic. However, we believe that deeper investigation 
proves Buddhism to have been originally and fundamen- 
tally monotheistic. Brahm was "pure intelligence, sole 
and self-existent," and Buddha ''absolute light and per- 
fect wisdom." These are attributes that pertain only to 
a personal God. 

Professed atheism in civilized lands is sometimes looked 
upon as a disproof of the general rule. But this reason- 



30 A System of Natural Theism 

ing is not sound for the following considerations : First, 
atheism is rare and exceptional, rather proving than dis- 
proving the general rule; second, atheism is the result of 
a kind of speculative thinking that usually disregards the 
testimony of consciousness and experience; third, athe- 
ists always posit some primal cause in the place of God 
and predicate of it many Godlike qualities. 

(2) Now what is the clear inference from the univer- 
sal belief in God ? Surely it must connote that He exists. 
If there is no God, if there is nothing in the universe but 
material substance, how could the idea of God ever have 
arisen at all in the human mind ? Could mere materiality 
ever have evolved the conception of a divine Being? 
Water cannot rise higher than its source. And why 
should the idea of God have become so general, persistent, 
dominant and potent? If material substance is the only 
entity, and yet has led almost the entire human family 
to believe that there is a God, then material substance 
must be a universal falsifier. In that case you could not 
trust its testimony on any subject. 

Let us apply the scientific law of casuality to this argu- 
ment: every effect must have an adequate cause. If there 
is a God, and He created the world, and implanted in 
man's mind the germ of the God idea, we have an entirely 
adequate cause for the grand effect, namely, that practic- 
ally all men and nations believe in the divine existence. 
This view will also account adequately for the spontaneity 
of the idea in the universal human mind. 

Let us also apply the law of evolution to this locus. 
If there is no God back of the cosmos, the idea of God 
never could have arisen in the human mind ; for nothing 
can be evolved that was not previously involved. The 



General Argument 31 

idea of Deity could never have evolved from a no-God 
source. Mere material substance never could evolve by 
only its resident forces into any idea, much less so great 
an idea as that of a Supreme and Absolute Being. Water 
does not rise higher than its source. However, if God 
is back of and in the evolutionary process, an adequate 
cause has been assigned for the grand outcome. 

Should the objection be raised that, if there is a God, 
He would have bestowed upon the human family a clear 
and perfect conception of His being and character from 
the start, we would reply that God evidently has chosen 
the method of development rather than the method of 
initial completeness. Geology teaches that the lower 
forms of life appeared first ; afterwards the higher forms. 
"First the corn, then the ear, then the full com in the 
ear" seems to be God's modus operandi in nature. For 
purposes of His own, whose wisdom we may not ques- 
tion. He has ordained also that the conception of Him- 
self shall be a matter of development. The science of the 
day, which holds so strenuously to the doctrine of devel- 
opment, should interpose no objection to this method of 
the divine procedure. 

2. The universal religious instinct; 

( I ) Men in all the world not only believe in God, but 
also engage in acts of worship and devotion. The most 
recent ethnological researches prove that religious sen- 
timents exist in all nations and tribes. A few years ago 
the National Geographic Society sent out its scientific 
representatives to study the various ethnic tribes of the 
world. After the most careful and unbiased investiga- 
tions, all these men testified that they had found no 



32 A System of Natural Theism 

people which did not have some form of religion, some 
religious sentiment. This was the testimony, not of theo- 
logians, but of purely scientific investigators, who could 
have had no ex parte interest in the results. 

(2) Not only so, but the religious principle is ex- 
tremely potent in all nations, dominating individual and 
community life. It is not merely a negligible factor. 
Witness the predominant influence of rehgion in India, 
China and Japan. The same is true of peoples who are 
very low in the scale of civiHzation, as, for example, the 
jungle folk of Africa. 

(3) Everywhere the human heart has a craving for 
God — "feels after Him, if perchance it may find Him" 
(Acts 17:27). The Psalmist puts this general yearning 
in vivid phrase: "As the heart panteth after the water 
brooks, so panteth my soul after thee, O God : My soul 
thirsteth for God, for the living God" (Psalm 42:1, 2). 

(4) It will be said that there arc exceptions, at least, 
in the so-called civilized countries; that there are people 
who do not seem to have any desire for rehgion and 
religious worship. We reply, the apparent exceptions do 
not invalidate the rule, and that for the following reasons : 

a. There are men here and there who have obscure 
and crass ideas of the good and the beautiful as well as of 
the spiritual. Does this prove that there is not an inher- 
ent ethical and esthetic principle in human nature ? 

b. Sin has come into the world, and has darkened 
man's spiritual insight ; has, in a measure, brought a feel- 
ing of constraint between God and men, and in many 
instances has partly seared the human conscience. 

c. Even unbelievers and rationalists often feel im- 
pelled to substitute some form of religion and worship 



General Argument 33 

for the forms they seek to destroy. As conspicuous 
examples, note Comte, Strauss, Hseckel, Tyndal, etc. 

(5) Now what are the logical inferences from the 
foregoing facts? 

a. It is reasonable to believe that there must be a 
reality to complement and answer to this universal crav- 
ing for communion with God. In nature's realm food is 
provided to satisfy hunger, water for thirst, music for 
the ear, light and color for the eye. The only comple- 
ment for the universal religious craving would be a 
personal God. Is it probable that we have been constituted 
to have our bodily wants supplied, while our higher wants, 
those of the soul, must go unsatisfied ? If such were the 
case, the cosmos would not be a rational one. 

b. Again, apply the laws of evolution and causality 
to this locus. Mere natural evolution from material sub- 
stance never could have produced a longing for God and 
an instinct to worship Him. Every effect must have an 
adequate cause. Whatever is evolved must, at some pre- 
vious time, have been germinally involved. If mere mate- 
rial substance is the ground and cause of all things, and 
has simply by its own resident forces evolved the theistic 
idea and the yearning for God, we would here have an 
effect that is greater than its cause ; which is scientifically 
absurd. Every cause must be as great as, or greater 
than, its effect. 



CHAPTER III 

TELEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT^ 

I. DEFINITIONS 

1. Etymology of the term: xeAos, end, and \6yos, 
discourse. 

2. The TeleologicaP Argument is the proof of the 
divine existence which is based on the evidence o£ de- 
sign, purpose and adaptation in the creation. It is often 
called the argument of design, purpose or final cause. 

3. The Final Cause is the end or purpose in the mind 
of the designer in the planning and making of a structure. 
It is called the Final Cause because its manifestation 
appears at the end of the process. In reality it is the 
primary cause, for it exists first of all in the mind of the 
designer. 

4. The Efficient Cause is the force or forces em- 
ployed by the designer to bring about the desired effect. 

5. Adaptation is the selection and use of the proper 
means to secure the desired end. 

6. Final Cause and Efficient Cause are thus re- 

1. On this argument compare the following valuable works: Valentine, 
ut supra, pp. 74-205 (most thorough-going) ; Orr, "The Christian View of 
God and the World," pp. 97-103, 415-418; Lindsay, "Recent Advances in 
Theistic Philosophy," pp. 170-215; Fisher, "The Grounds of Theistic and 
Christian Belief," pp. 29-55; Balfour, "Theism and Humanism," pp. 42-63 
(rather unique in mode of presentation) ; Micou, "Basic Ideas in Religion," 
pp. 50-99 (also consult index); Bruce, "Apologetics," pp. 150-153 (clear and 
succinct); Ward, "What I Believe and Why," Chapters I-XII. 

2. Sometimes called the Eutaxiological Argument when desitm in the 
universe as a whole is considered. From evr^la, order, and \6yos. 

34 



Teleological Argument 35 

lated; The former determines what forces or energies 
shall constitute the latter and how they shall be employed 
throughout the process. Final Cause is dependent on the 
Efficient Causes that are available for accomplishing its 
purpose. Thus they are mutually dependent. Efficient 
Cause without Final Cause would bring only chaos ; Final 
Cause without Efficient Cause would be helpless. 

II. PROOFS OF DESIGN IN THE COSMOS^ 

1. In organisms: 

The eye, the ear, the hand, foot, lungs, heart, man's 
entire anatomical structure; the structure of animals. 

The latest researches in physiology prove that the 
human eye has 800 complemental contrivances,* all of 
which are necessary to sight. Study its complicated 
structure, and note what a wonderful piece of mechanism 
it is. Its various parts are so constructed and combined 
as to bring about, so far as we can understand, only one 
purpose, namely, vision. If the mechanism of the eye 
was ever designed for any other purpose than sight, it has 
never dawned on the intelligence of man. However, even 
the 800 organic particulars do not exhaust the number 
in the eye, for it must be remembered that the substance 
of this organ is composed of atoms, molecules, and per- 
haps of vortices, ions and electrons, and all these had 
to be brought together in conformity with the plan and 
purpose of eye. 

The ear is scarcely less complicated. But how differ- 
ent from the eye! Its purpose being different, it has 
been organized on an entirely different model, and one 

3. Many of the examples are selected from Valentine's presentation. 

4. Kinsley, "Was Christ Divine?" p. 13. 



36 A System of Natural Theism 

O 
that points just as inevitably to a definite purpose. The 
very fact that it is so different from the eye, because its 
purpose is so different, accentuates the proof of specific 
design for auditory ends. 

Every part of the human hand connotes a definite end 
in view. If the human hand were Hke that of the mon- 
key, man, with all his intelligence, could make little or no 
progress in mechanics, and that would make progress 
and civilization almost impossible. None of the arts and 
sciences could be developed. 

The human foot was evidently designed for the specific 
end of enabling man to walk, and walk uprightly. What 
a beneficent arrangement that was! Just one point: 
There is a ligament running crosswise of the instep which 
holds the parallel cords in their place in the graceful and 
necessary curve on the upper part of the foot. This fact 
is so patent and convincing a proof of confederate and 
specific purpose that it cannot be gainsaid. 

But note man's entire anatomical structure. All these 
various organs are combined into a unified plan. Res- 
spiration, circulation and digestion all join to produce a 
specific result, just as if they had been put together by 
marvelous foresight. Note this, too : the retina is only in 
the eye; the tympanum only in the ear; the olfactory 
nerves only in the nose ; the palate only at the upper end 
of the throat ; all these are placed just where they should 
be for their several highly specialized purposes. 

In the animal world the bird is organized on a highly 
specialized scheme for flying ; the fish for swimming ; the 
serpent for crawling; the quadruped for walking. Here 
is not only evidence of design, but also evidence of end- 
less diversity of design. 



Teleological Argument 37 

2. In animal instinct : 

Design is seen in the marvelous instinct of the bees in 
making their combs on the precise mathematical model 
best adapted for their purpose, combining lightness, 
strength and proper dimensions. No less marvelous is 
the instinct of ants, wasps, spiders and many other in- 
sects. Who taught the wasps and hornets to make their 
papier machef Callow birds in the nest have only one 
way to be fed : almost immediately after they come from 
the shell, their instinct impels them to open their mouths 
for their food. Each species of animal instinctively takes 
its infantile food in its own way, and here again nature 
shows endless variety. "Each after its kind." 

3. In chemistry and physics: 

In this realm there is patent proof of design. The 
combinations of atoms and molecules in various ways 
always bring about a highly specialized result. Oxygen 
and nitrogen are combined in precisely the right ratio to 
form the volatile atmosphere which we breathe to sustain 
life, being fitted especially to the human organism, A 
different combination of these elements would be abso- 
lutely fatal to animal life of any kind. Thus chemistry 
dovetails into biology. Hydrogen and oxygen in specific 
ratio form water, which again is admirably adapted to 
human and animal need. 

Respecting water there is a specific fact that is worthy 
of attention. Cold almost invariably contracts substances. 
As water cools, it follows this general law to a certain 
degree of temperature; then just at the right point — the 
"strategic" moment, we had almost said — it begins to 
expand by virtue of its crystalizing propensity, forms 



38 A System of Natural Theism 

ice, becomes lighter than the water, and remains on the 
upper surface. If it continued to contract and grow 
heavier, the ice would sink to the bottom of all our rivers, 
ponds and lakes; soon they would be converted into a 
solid mass of ice during the winter, destroying all animal 
life in the water, and melting very little during the sum- 
mer. Neither would the warmth of summer ever suc- 
ceed in thawing the frost out of the ground. What a 
beneficent contrivance of nature do we see here! 

Fire for warmth is another beneficent arrangement. It 
also produces carbon dioxide and aqueous vapor, which 
are then absorbed by the trees and grasses as their food. 
As fire is the result of the combination of the oxygen 
of the air and the carbon of combustible substances, why 
does not a little blaze set the entire atmosphere into con- 
flagration? Because nature has herself placed an em- 
bargo on such a result. As Dr. Milton Valentine says: 
"Everything appears to be ordered so as to run in chan- 
nels of economic utility." 

4. In biology: 

The growth, divisions and combinations of cells are 
so specific in bringing about the various forms of life 
and organisms that no one can fail to see here abundant 
proof of intentionality. 

5. In psychology: 

The human mind usually acts with conscious and defi- 
nite purpose. Let it be remembered that the human mind 
is part of the cosmos, and is fitted into it in a most vital 
way. The very fact that it is a purposive mind implies 
the idea of purpose in the cosmos. 



Teleological Argument 39 

6. In the universe as a whole: 

Its wise arrangement, its unity of plan, its mathemat- 
ical precision of movement, and its adaptation in innu- 
merable ways to human need — ^all these point indubitably 
to final cause in its origin and structure. Many persons 
who are not deeply impressed with the argument of design, 
when applied to individual structures in nature, are con- 
vinced of the validity of the design argument when applied 
to the entire cosmos.^ 

III. DESIGN CONNOTES AN INTELLIGENT 
DESIGNER 

1. Intelligence is the most natural and spontaneous 
explanation of order, purpose and adaptation. There- 
fore, to seek another cause for these effects in the cos- 
mos, as Hume and Mill did, is to disregard the innate 
feelings and conceptions of the human mind. Besides, 
why should men try to find some obscure and indefinite 
cause when one may be seen lying clearly on the surface ? 

2. The only cause of design that we know of is 
mind. We certainly can attribute purpose and finality 
to no other known source. Therefore, either mind is the 
cause of the wonderful confederation seen in the uni- 
verse, or else we know nothing of its causation. Our 
choice must lie between Theism and Agnosticism. 

3. What is the only alternative of an intelligent 
First Cause? It is chance. We must choose between 

5. However, we cannot agree to such methods of reasoning. Suppose 
you were to pass through a great factory or mill, constructed for the spe- 
cific purpose of turning out a certain product, would you say that the struc- 
ture as whole gives proof of design, but the smaller mechanisms do not? 
You surely would not reason in so lame a way. Every individual part of 
the structure is a work of design. If it were not, the factory would never 
turn its specific product. So with the universe. 



40 A System of Natural Theism 

God and chance. But chance is utterly inadequate for the 
following reasons: 

(i) It is unthinkable that blind chance could ever 
produce anything but chaos. But the universe is a cos- 
mos, not a chaos. Let us think for a moment. Could 
an orderly world ever have evolved out of chaos without 
an ordering Intelligence? The outstanding principle of 
the cosmos is law. Scientific men today are constantly 
ringing the changes on "the reign of law." If the world 
was produced by chance, then chance produced the very 
antithesis of itself ! That certainly would be a marvelous 
exploit. It would be a greater miracle than the creation 
of the universe by an all-wise and all-powerful God. 

(2) In this connection let us note the mathematical 
law of probability in permutations and geometrical pro- 
gression : 

On ten bells 3,628,800 changes can be rung. How 
much probability would there be of these ten bells ever 
playing the tune, "My country, 'tis of thee," by pure 
chance? Everyone knows this never could occur. Yet 
a trained mind could so manipulate the ten bells as to play 
many tunes. Thus design and order always imply intel- 
ligence — mind. 

The figure 2, multiplied in geometrical progression, 
requires, in the fifth order, 19,729 figures to express it. 
Again, this indicates the degrees of improbability for 
mere chance to accomplish any specific purpose. 

The 26 letters of the English alphabet are capable of 
so many diflferent combinations that they would require 
27 figures to express them. How much probability would 
there be that these letters would ever fall together into 
a book by pure fortuity ? Yet, human intelligence, work- 



Teleological Argument 41 

ing with design, may combine them in such order as to 
form vast libraries. 

Take loo dice blocks, numbered from one to lOO, in 
your hand, and fling them promiscuously on the floor. 
How often would you have to repeat the performance to 
cause them to fall in a straight row and in numerical 
order? However, by using thought and purpose you can 
easily lay them down in that way. 

As has been said, the human eye has 800 complemental 
particulars, each of which is essential to sight. But this 
falls far short of the reality, for the eye'is composed of an 
inconceivable number of atoms, molecules and living cells, 
to say nothing of vortices, ions, and electrons. There 
certainly would not be much chance for chance in this 
case. It should also be remembered that the eye is set 
in the midst of a congeries of many other organs, just as 
wonderful as itself, to which it is fitted and which are 
adapted to it. Divine intelligence back of this wonder- 
fully purposeful arrangement is the only adequate 
explanation. 

4. The human mind, with all its rational, self-deter- 
mining and purposive powers, is a part of the cosmos, and 
is organically related to it. But the mental could not 
evolve from the non-mental, the purposive from the non- 
purposive, nor freedom from bald necessity. It is rational 
to believe that the Power that produced the human mind 
would be at least as purposive as its product. 

5. All science is based on the principle that the cos- 
mos is intelligible to the human mind. Otherwise no 
kind of science would be possible ; no order would be dis- 
cernible ; no classification of data could be made. As the 
cosmos is capable of being apprehended by intelligence. 



42 A System of Natural Theism 

it must be the product of intelligence. This is practically 
the argument of Plato's doctrine of "Ideas" discernible 
in the cosmos. 

6. The science of mathematics furnishes cogent proof 
that an intelligent Being designed and constructed the 
universe. By abstract processes the human mind can 
solve mathematical problems, and arrive at absolutely 
correct results. Now, when these principles are applied 
to the universe, as in mathematical astronomy, it is found 
that there is an exact correspondence between the prin- 
ciples and the empirical data. The universe is constructed 
according to a mathematical plan. Again this fact con- 
notes intelligence — a mathematical Mind— as the cause 
of the universe, ^^i--'^-'- :-^f'\t4^7t^u^'{MK!;. ' --' i'^^'€4^-0 

7. As a scientific hypothesis, Theilm is an adequate 
explanation of the cosmos and its phenomena, with all 
its marks of intentionality. No other hypothesis is ade- 
quate. According to scientific procedure, we ought to 
adopt the hypothesis that furnishes an adequate explana- 
tion of all the data. 

8. To rivet the conclusion, the evidences of design in 
the universe prove that intelligence and will must be 
its cause; but intelligence and will are the attributes of 
personality; therefore, the cause of the universe must 
be a Person — God. 

IV. OBJECTIONS TO TELEOLOGY STATED 
AND CONFUTED 

I. Objection: Nature and art are very different in 
their operations; therefore, design in the former may 
come from some other source than intelligence and per- 
sonality. This is the objection of Hume and Mill. 



Teleological Argument 43 

Reply : Observe that this argument is based on a mere 
"may be." Without impugning the motives of the object- 
ors, it creates the impression that it is a makeshift to avoid 
a reasonable conclusion. At all events, it seeks for an 
obscure and unknown cause rather than to accept the 
obvious and natural one. The human mind intuitively 
attributes design to intelligence and intelligence to per- 
sonaHty. Therefore, the above objection runs counter 
to the normal processes of human thinking. 

2. Objection: In nature the moving force is imma- 
nent (that is, within the structure) ; in art it is external. 
This is the chief argument of Pantheism. 

Reply: While it is true that in nature the moving 
principle is within the structure, yet there must be some- 
thing back of the immanent force to start and direct it 
along adaptive lines, or the result would be chaos instead 
of law and order. Blind force would surely be inade- 
quate to produce orderly results, whether brought about 
immanently or transcendentally. "Unconscious intelli- 
gence" is a contradiction of terms. There can be no 
intelligence which does not work in the light of its own 
consciousness. Besides, many works of art, like watches 
and other humanly contrived mechanisms, operate im- 
manently; yet no one ever thinks that they made them- 
selves or were put together by chance. How much less 
the wonderful mechanisms of nature? The very fact 
that the forces in nature's operations are immanent is 
all the more convincing proof of the wonderful intelli- 
gence and power of nature's Contriver. 

3. Objection: Mere evolution, with its laws of 
natural selection and the survival of the fittest, is a suffi- 
cient explanation of the cosmos, including man. This is 



44 A System of Natural Theism 

the argument of Materialism and Naturalistic Evolu- 
tion. 

Reply: Evolution, if scientifically proved to be true, 
would demand a Supreme Intelligence back of the won- 
derful process to initiate and direct it; for nothing can 
be evolved that was not previously involved; and surely 
mere chance could not establish a regular order and 
modus operandi. Mere evolution explains nothing ulti- 
mate. It is not a power and intelligence in itself; it is 
merely a mode of operation, a law of development. The 
fundamental question is, What is the cause of the evo- 
lutionary process? What or who formulated the laws 
of evolution? Materialism is always superficial, because 
it stops before it reaches the Primal Cause of all the laws 
of orderly development. Can a law devise, administer 
and execute itself? Such great evolutionists as A. R. 
Wallace, Richard Owen, St. George Mivart, Asa Gray, 
Richard Dana and John Fiske maintained that Theism 
is the necessary postulate of evolution. 

4. Objection: "Adaptation is the necessary law of 
existence" 

Reply: This again is a superficial mode of reason- 
ing, for you might ask why it is so, even if it were the 
truth. But it is not true, for chaos might just as well 
exist as order, if there is no ordering Intelligence back 
of the world. The higher the organism the more diffi- 
cult to produce and preserve. Any one can see that 
disorder would be much easier to produce than order. 
A well-known principle is that intelligence is always 
required to "bring order out of chaos/' Again, the cru- 
cial question is, Why should blind chance want to pro- 
duce a world at all, whether a chaos or a cosmos? On 



Teleological Argument 45 

the other hand, if there is a God, we can easily see why 
He should create the universe. True science always 
seeks for the explanation that is adequate. 

5. Objection; There are some things in nature that 
do not have any apparent purpose, and others that do 
not seem to be wisely contrived. Do not these facts 
invalidate Teleology? 

Reply: Admitting the above proposition to be true, 
we may well lay the emphasis on the words "apparent" 
and "seem." Our inability to see design, or the wisdom 
of design, in any object does not disprove design, but 
simply proves our inability to perceive it. There are 
few things, however, in which we cannot see some wise 
purpose, even if it be only for man's moral discipline. 
A perfect world, one in which there were no trials and 
mysteries, certainly would not be well adapted to bring 
out the sturdy and heroic human virtues. There may 
be people to whom this argument makes no appeal, but 
they prove by that very token that their moral standards 
are not of a high order ; that they would prefer an exist- 
ence of mere automatic pleasure (Epicureanism) to one 
that develops moral character. Again, the general rule 
is that nature reveals design; we should not make the 
exceptions the rule. Still again, many things that once 
were supposed to be useless have in recent years been 
proven to have great utility. This would indicate that 
further progress in science may prove that all things 
have their use, and it is part of God's design that men's 
minds shall be developed by their efforts to discover all 
His great and wise purposes. Moreover, it has been 
good for man both mentally and morally to trust the 
wisdom and good will of the Power that is back of the 



46 A System of Natural Theism 

Universe. No doubt, too, the advent of sin introduced 
some confusion into the realm of nature just as it has 
brought discord into the human sphere. Pessimism — 
the philosophy of the daunted and discouraged — ^may see 
only the apparent defects in the cosmos; rational optim- 
ism sees the evils, but "trusts in God and does its best." 

6. Objection: There are areas in the world where 
chance seems to rule. We speak of accidents, good luck, 
bad luck, chance, fortuity. These words connote reality, 
not mere fancy or delusion. A hundred dice blocks thrown 
down haphazard would never fall in a straight row and 
in consecutive order. Rocks hurled from the crater of 
a volcano fall in great confusion upon the surrounding 
country. 

Reply: There is just enough of a realm of chance 
in the world to prove how utterly inadequate it would 
be to account for the innumerable evidences of design. 
The instances of chance simply accentuate the instances 
of order and purpose. In reality, however, there is no 
chance in the world; all is controlled by law; only in 
some cases the law does not come sufficiently within the 
range of human intelligence to enable us to see the 
evidences of its operation and the purpose of its De- 
signer. Every dice block cast upon the floor falls into 
its place by the operation of inevitable laws, such as 
force, momentum, gravity, hardness, friction, etc. So 
with every rock hurled from a volcano. 

Summation o£ the argument: 

Teleology is evident in the cosmos; design connotes 
intelligence and will; intelligence and will connote per- 
sonality; therefore the primal cause of the cosmos, with 



Teleological Argument 47 

its order and design, must be a Person. This Person the 
Theist calls God. 



V. TELEOLOGY PROVES GOD TO BE ALL- 
WISE AND INFINITE 

1. There are reasoners who concede that design con- 
notes intelligence and personality, and therefore a God 
back of the cosmos; but they deny that it proves Him 
to be all-wise and infinite. They base their objections 
on the defects and imperfections in the natural and 
human realms. They also contend that the universe is 
not infinite — and this we grant; therefore its Maker 
need not be infinite — which we do not grant. 

2. In refutation we offer the following considera- 
tions : 

(i) The processes of the cosmos are so intricate, so 
complicated, so inconceivably numerous, so profound and 
mysterious, that the human mind almost spontaneously 
feels that the wisdom which invented and created all of 
them, and set them in operation, and now upholds them, 
must be infinite. 

(2) In contriving and making the universe, with all 
its complexity and extent, the possible contingencies that 
might have arisen would demand an infinite intelligence 
to provide for all of them, and prevent any miscarriage 
of the vast and intricate plan. 

(3) The universe is so vast, and therefore its ultimate 
purpose must so be far-reaching, as to require omniscience 
as its most reasonable ground. To contrive so vast a plan, 
and then to uphold all its infinitesimal parts in the great 



48 A System of Natural Theism 

unity of the original design, would require a wisdom 
which, so far as we can see, would have to be infinite. 

(4) If God is infinite in wisdom, it is reasonable to be- 
lieve that He must be infinite in all His other attributes ; 
or, to put it still more cogently, it would be utterly absurd 
to suppose that God could be infinite in one attribute and 
finite in His other attributes and the essence of His being. 
Therefore the argument from Teleology proves that God 
is an Infinite Being or Personality. 



CHAPTER IV 

COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT^ 

L DEFINITIONS 

1. The etymology of the term cosmology: K6<:fio<i, 
world, and Aoyo?, discourse. However, the derivation of 
the word does not give a real clue to the argument, and 
therefore the definition given below must be committed 
and understood. 

2. Cosmos means a world of order, and is therefore 
the antithesis of chaos. 

3. The Cosmological Argument is the argument that 
the cosmos is an effect produced by a Primal Cause, 
which, from the nature of the case, must be a Person. 
Sometimes it is called the argument from causality, or 
from cause and effect. ^ 

II. THE PRINCIPLE OF CAUSALITY: 

1. Statement: 

Every effect and event must have an adequate cause. 
Some objection has been raised to the words "effect" and 
"cause" when thus connected, on the ground, as Valen- 
tine^ says, that "then the proposition would involve only 

1. Here consult the authors in loco cited in the first footnote for Chap- 
ter III. 

2. Also called the Etiological Argument from airia, cause, and X6'yos. 

3. "Natural Theology," p. 61. 

49 



50 A System of Natural Theism 

the self -evidence of verbal correlatives." However, the 
mode of reasoning employed to establish this objection 
strikes us as vague and abstruse. "Effect" and "cause" 
may be verbal correlatives, but "event" and "cause" are 
essential correlatives, and therefore the logical process is 
the same whether the word "event" or the word "effect" 
is used. The simple statement, "Every effect must have 
an adequate cause," at once impresses the normal mind 
as an axiomatic truth — one that stands in its own inherent 
right, and needs no more proof than the statement that 
two plus two equal four, or that a straight line is the 
shortest distance between two points. Indeed, to our 
mind the word "effect" is better than the word "event," 
for the mind at once grasps the simple idea of effect, 
while it must always make more or less effort to get the 
full concept of an event. The idea of an effect is simple, 
meaning a result of any kind, while that of an event is 
complex, involving always the connotation that it must 
be something that has had a beginning, something that 
has come into being where there was nothing of the kind 
before. Of course both forms of statement are true: 
"Every effect must have an adequate cause" and "Every 
event must have an adequate cause." 

2. Proofs of the principle: 

(i) It is a primary intuition of the human mind, 
like an axiom in mathematics. This, on the face of it, 
is a strong reason for its acceptance without any attempt 
at logical demonstration. Very few people would try 
to prove that 2 plus 2 equal 4. Most men would say that 
it is a necessary intuition in a world constructed as the 
present cosmos is and with such a mental constitution 
as human beings possess. 



Cosmological Argument 51 

(2) It is practically a universal concept. The only 
persons who profess to doubt it are those men who be- 
come confused by metaphysical speculations, and who, 
therefore, demand a logical proof for propositions that 
are known only by the mind's natural intuitions and not 
by logical processes. Even logic itself has no function 
unless it accepts as reliable the native human intuitions. 

(3) The science of the day is all based on the funda- 
mental proposition that effects are really caused. When- 
ever an effect is noted in the physical or the psychical 
realm, the scientist of today invariably seeks for its cause, 
and demands that the cause be adequate. 

(4) To hold that we only imagine a casual connec- 
tion, when there is none, after all, is to assert that man 
is afflicted "with mental impotence; that his mind is 
elementally false in its functioning. Kant's view that 
there is no real "nexus" between cause and effect makes 
human thought abortive. Hume and Mill, lost in specu- 
lations and depending only on logical processes, taught that 
there is only a time relation, only the relation of ante- 
cedent and consequent, between what we call cause and 
effect; but this is wrong, and for at least two reasons: 
a. The mind intuitively concludes that there is a real pro- 
ducing force in the antecedent that precedes the effect; 
and why should not the intuitional faculty be as reliable 
as the logical faculty? b. The mind cannot rest satis- 
fied without asking the question why such and such con- 
sequences invariably follow such and such antecedents, 
if there is no causal relation between them. Surely mere 
parallelism and coincidence are not adequate explanations. 
We stand firmly on the basis of the universal intuitions, 
experiences and concepts of human thought. 



52 A System of Natural Theism 

IV. THE UNIVERSE AN EFFECT 

I. The universe is real, not imaginary. We have al- 
ready presented our reasons for accepting the native in- 
tuitions of the human mind.* Here we will simply state 
that the speculations of Kant and other advocates of the 
phenomenalistic school are not valid. Their contention 
is as follows : We do not know ''things in themselves" — 
called novimena — but know only phenomena. There- 
fore the human mind may be so constructed that it im- 
poses its own "forms of thought" upon phenomena, and 
thus we cannot be sure that its intuitions of outward 
reality are true to the facts. Things may not be at all 
what they seem. The phenomena apprehended by the 
mind may not correspond at all to the things themselves, 
because the mind may distort them by its own constitu- 
tional bent and make-up. 

In reply we say, it is true, we do not know the essence 
of things, but only their phenomena. But why should not 
the phenomena give to the mind a true report of objec- 
tive reality as far as the mind is able to comprehend it? 
Is the world based on false and hypocritical principles? 
There is no evidence that such is the case. Then why 
should it be assumed or even imagined, that the human 
mind is afflicted with hallucination, so that it distorts ob- 
jective reality, and does not, so far as it is endowed with 
the ability, apprehend things in their true aspects and 
relations? Should it be said that we are often deluded 
by mirages, ignes fatui, and other mere appearances, 
we reply that we usually are able sooner or later to cor- 

4. The problem of the nature and validity of knowledge, called Epis- 
temology, is one of the outstanding problems of philosophy. It is treated 
searchingly and extensively in Dr. Samuel Harris's "The Philosophical 
Basis of Theism," Chapters II-VII. The reader is also referred to Hib- 
ben's clear exposition in his "The Problems of Philosophy," Chapter VI. 



Cosmological Argument 53 

rect such delusions by discovering the reality in the case. 
Besides, if there were no objective reality, there would 
not even be a mirage. Somewhere in the vicinity there 
must be the real landscape that is imaged on the rari- 
fied air. If you move toward the mirage, it will pres- 
ently disappear, and you will know that it was only a 
reflection, and hence an optical illusion; but if you see 
a real landscape and approach it, you will find it there. 
Thus human experience is able to distinguish between an 
illusion and a reality. If all the world were an illusion, 
no such distinction could be made. 

Nothing is clearer, either, than that the human mind 
readily distinguishes between a mere coincidence and a 
real case of cause and effect. For instance, if two persons, 
without any previous understanding, should happen to 
meet at the intersection of two roads, we would say at once 
that it was simply a coincidence. However, if they should 
previously arrange by telephone to meet at that particular 
place, we would say the result was due to a real and ade- 
quate cause. What absurdity of reasoning it would be 
to attribute all antecedents and consequents to mere coin- 
cidence or fortuity ! 

Again, it is quite gratuitous to assume that the human 
mind is so constructed as to be mal-apropos to the cosmos 
in which it is placed. Being here, and being highly en- 
dowed with certain distinguishing qualities, it is much 
more reasonable to believe that it has been made to fit 
truly into the environment in which it has been placed. 
If it is not; if it is deluded in all its intuitions, or if it 
sees everything in distorted form, then the world, includ- 
ing man, is a hodgepodge, not a cosmos. Then, too, we 
might as well abandon all efforts at arriving at scientific 



54 A System of Natural Theism 

and philosophical truth. In that case, too, the con- 
clusions of skepticism and agnosticism would be just as 
unreliable. Let us cease to think altogether, if all our 
thinking is a delusion and a snare. 

The philosophy of Idealism goes further than that of 
mere phenomenalism (Kant and Comte), but we shall 
deal with it under its proper head in Part III of this work. 

2. Being real, the universe is finite, because it is made 
up, as to its physical constitution, of finite parts, called 
atoms, aions or electrons; and no number of finite parts 
added together could ever reach infinity. The same prop- 
osition is true of the mental world; no addition of finite 
minds could ever aggregate an infinite mind. We think 
this statement self-evident. Yet the objection has been 
raised that an infinite number of parts added together 
would sum up infinity. But that is an unthinkable assump- 
tion, for you never could arrive at an infinite number of 
parts. The infinite belongs to a different category from 
the finite. It is not something that is either physical or 
partible. Moreover, if you even could add together an in- 
finite number of minds, you would simply have that many 
different minds, not an infinite unitary mind. Therefore 
we maintain that the only tenable position is that the uni- 
verse, however vast, is finite. 

3. Being finite, the universe must be dependent. 
All its parts are found to be dependent; therefore as a 
whole it must be dependent. 

4. Being finite and dependent, the universe must 
have had a beginning; for if it were eternal, it could not 
be finite and dependent. How could it be infinite in one 
way, that of eternity, and finite in other respects? Then, 
if it were eternal, it would be self -existent, for it never 



Cosmological Argument 55 

would have been brought into being ; but we have already 
proved from its finity that it must be dependent as a whole 
and in all its parts. 

5. If the universe is finite and dependent and had a 
beginning, its inception must have been an effect and an 
event that demand an adequate cause outside of itself. 
An effect cannot be its own cause. The universe, there- 
fore, could not be its own cause. This leads us logically 
to our next proposition. 

V. THE CAUSE OF THE UNIVERSE 

1. The Creator: 

If the universe is finite and dependent or contingent and 
had a beginning, it must have been created. If there 
ever was a time when it was not, there is no thinkable 
way of its having been brought into being save by an act 
of creation. But creation demands a Creator. 

2. The Creator the First Cause: 

If the Creator of the universe was not the First Cause, 
He must have been created by another Creator; but we 
know nothing of one or more such intermediary beings. 
At all events, our thought must go back finally to the 
Primal Creator, for thought cannot rest in the idea of 
an infinite series of causes suspended on nothing. Such 
a conception spells nihilism of thought. 

3. The First Cause eternal and uncaused : 

There is something now — that is, something really ex- 
ists at the present time. All the universe, including our- 
selves, is evidence of that fact. No normal mind will 
deny so self-evident a proposition. Now, if there ever 



56 A System of Natural Theism 

was a time when there was nothing, nothing could have 
ever been. Therefore something must have always ex- 
isted. From this it follows that the ultimate or primal 
cause must be eternal and self -existent, the uncaused 
Cause of all other existences. 

4. The First Cause a Person : 

(i) The creation of the universe must have been a 
free, voluntary act, not a coerced one. It is unreason- 
able to believe that the eternal, self-existent, independent 
First Cause should have been compelled by anything in 
Himself to create a world; and of course there was noth- 
ing outside of Himself yet in existence to coerce Him. 
Therefore we maintain that the creation of the universe 
must have been a free act of the Creator; but freedom 
can be predicated only of a person, never of a thing ; there- 
fore the First Cause (or the Creator) must be a Person. 

(2) The universe is a cosmos, evincing order and de- 
sign in its constitution ; but order and design connote in- 
telligence and freedom, and intelligence and freedom con- 
note personality. Therefore the cosmos demands a Per- 
son as its only adequate Cause. 

(3) Human beings are part of the cosmos, and they 
are persons. The only adequate cause for such an effect 
is a First Cause who is a Person. How could personal- 
ities ever have evolved from an impersonal source? Re- 
member we are seeking for the scientific principle of an 
adequate cause for all events and effects. 

(4) Human personalities — a very important part of 
the universe — have self-consciousness, freedom, morality, 
and spirituality. The only adequate cause that could 
have produced these personal qualities must be a personal 



Cosmological Argument 57 

Creator. Mere materialistic evolution would have been 
utterly inadequate to produce these great and unique re- 
sults. Can the scientific mind of the day rest satisfied in 
assigning anything but an adequate cause for all the phen- 
omena of the cosmos? Let us remember that human per- 
sonalities are phenomena of the highest order. High 
results demand a high cause — one that is adequate. To 
assign a cause that is insufficient is contrary to the scien- 
tific methods and temper of the day. 

5. The First Cause infinite: 

(i) If the Creator were not infinite, there would be 
something greater than He — that is, infinity — and He 
would not, after all, be the First Cause, self-existent and 
eternal. 

(2) If the Creator were not infinite in power, He 
would sometime become exhausted in sustaining so vast 
a universe. 

(3) If He were not infinite in wisdom, a contingency 
might sometime arise for which He was not prepared, 
and that would hurl Himself and the universe to ruin. 
His wisdom must be equal to every possible emergency. 
His knowledge must be perfect so that He can never be 
surprised and disconcerted. 

(4) If He were not infinite in love, justice, and self- 
control. He would sometime do wrong, and that would 
bring about His own destruction and that of His universe. 

(5) The number of possible contingencies in so vast 
a universe would demand that its Maker and Preserver 
be infinite in all His attributes. The principle of caus- 
ality requires an infinite personal Being back of all the 
data and phenomena of the universe. 



58 A System of Natural Theism 

VI. AN OBJECTION STATED AND REFUTED 

1. Objection: 

It is just as difficult to account for God as for the mate- 
rial universe. Therefore why not accept the hypothesis 
that the universe itself is eternal, self-existent and 
uncaused ? 

2. Refutation; 

Something now exists ; therefore something must have 
always existed. If there ever was a time when nothing 
existed, nothing could have ever come into existence. Ex 
nihilo nihil fit. Now, is it not more reasonable to believe 
that the primal entity was an ordering Mind than that it 
was mere blind force? Place God back of the universe, 
and you have an adequate cause and explanation of the 
universe and all its varied phenomena. Deny God's exist- 
ence, and you have no adequate explanation of the exist- 
ence of a single atom, to say nothing of all the various 
forms of life, intelligence, morality and spiritual belief 
and experience. You are plunged into intellectual, moral 
and spiritual agnosticism. Your science and philosophy 
break to pieces at their very fountain head. You have a 
universe without an adequate cause. 

Therefore the Cosmological Argument, based on the 
sound scientific and philosophic principle of causality, 
demands a personal God back of the cosmos as the only 
adequate cause of its being and diversified phenomena; 
therefore it is the only scientific hypothesis. 



CHAPTER V 

ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT^ 

I. DEFINITION 

1. Etymology of the term: 

flv, ovTo<s, being, and X6yo<s, discourse. The etymology, 
however, does not in itself give a clear idea of the precise 
form of the argument in Theism. See definition follow- 
ing: 

2. Meaning of the term as used in Theism: 

The Ontological Argument is the argument that is based 
on the idea possessed by the human mind of a perfect 
and absolute Being. 

II. HISTORICAL SKETCH 

1. The germs of the argument are found in Plato, 
who taught that our minds, in examining the cosmos, 
discover the evidence of ideas. If they were not there, 
our minds would not find them. Hence, he reasoned, 
there must be a Mind back of the cosmos whose ideas 
are reflected in its constitution and order. 

2. The argument was first elaborated and put into 
syllogistic form by Anselm (1093-1109 A. D.), who was 
its first real proponent and defender. The Anselmic form 

I. See footnote i, Chapter III, and consult the several authors in loco, 
especially Valentine, Orr and Micou. 

59 



60 A System of Natural Theism 

of the argument is given with slight modification under 
III below. 

3. It was further developed and modified by Des- 
cartes, Butler, Cousin, Leibnitz, and Sir William 
Hamilton. 

4. In the most recent times it has been acutely advo- 
cated in revised form by Dorner, Valentine, Orr, Fisher, 
Harris, Lindsay and Micou. 

III. STATEMENT OF THE ARGUMENT 

1. The mind possesses the idea of the perfect and ab- 
solute Being; 

2. Existence is a necessary attribute of such a Being, 
or He would not be perfect and absolute ; 

3. Therefore such a Being must exist. 

IV. CRITICISM OF THE ARGUMENT 

The first and second statements are true as separate 
statements ; but they are not related to each other as the 
major and minor premises of a syllogism, because the 
existence of a being is not necessarily included in the 
idea of a being. The mere idea of a thing does not neces- 
sitate or connote its existence. You may imagine a Cen- 
taur, but you know that such a creature has no existence ; 
it is purely a creature of the fancy. True, the idea of a 
perfect and absolute Being is a unique idea, as we shall 
show later; yet even then we must admit that the above 
threefold statement is not a true syllogism, and hence 
does not carry conviction to most minds. The very fact 
that few persons follow the reasoning and feel its force 
proves that it is at least obscure; that there is a dark 
place somewhere in the argument. Compare it with a 
true logical syllogism, and note the difference : 



Ontological Argument 61 

1. All men are mortal; 

2. John Jones is a man ; 

3. Therefore John Jones is mortal. 

Here we see that the man mentioned in the minor prem- 
ise belongs to the class named in the major premise. For 
that reason the conclusion is inevitable. However, the 
same relation does not subsist between the major and 
minor premises in the Ontological Argument. 

V. VALUE OF THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGU- 
MENT 

When properly stated, the argument has real value, 
even if it does not have convincing force. To some 
classes of minds it makes a very distinct appeal, while to 
a few it is regarded as the crowning proof of the divine 
existence. Let us note how far its validity extends. 

I. The idea of a perfect, absolute Being is, after some 
thought, found to be a necessary idea of the human 
mind. It is not a pure intuition, but follows necessarily 
from certain postulates of human thinking and experi- 
ence, such as the following : having the idea of the rela- 
tive, which all of us have, we cannot help thinking of the 
absolute; so the idea of the dependent implies the idea 
of the independent ; the derived the idea of the underived ; 
all effects and events the idea of an original uncaused 
Cause. We know that the relative, dependent and de- 
rived exist, for we see them all about us, and realize that 
we belong to the same category. But the moment you 
think of the contingent matters, that moment you get 
an inevitable conception of the ultimate uncontingent 
ground and basis of them all. 

Now, note : If the perfect and absolute Being does not 



62 A System of Natural Theism 

exist, our necessary ideas are false, and our minds have 
been so constructed as to delude us. On the other hand, 
if the perfect and absolute Being really exists, our neces- 
sary ideas have a true basis, and the mind, when it func- 
tions fundamentally, may be trusted. Herein lies the 
singular force of this argument — that the idea of the per- 
fect Being is a necessary idea of the human mind, whereas 
the idea of an imaginary being, or even a finite being, 
is not a necessary one. 

2. Let us now put the Ontological Argument in its 
proper syllogistic form: 

Major Premise : The human mind possesses the neces- 
sary idea of a perfect and absolute Being. 

Minor Premise: Existence is a necessary attribute of 
such a Being. 

Conclusion: Ergo, such a Being must exist, or our 
necessary ideas are null and void. 

You will observe that the legitimacy of the syllogism 
rests on the contingency of the or in the conclusion. On 
the ground that the intuitions and normal inferences of 
the human mind are valid and trustworthy, the method of 
reasoning is convincing. None but the phenomenalists 
will question it; and they, judged by their own theories 
of knowledge, cannot trust the validity of their own ques- 
tioning. 

3. The Ontological Argument may be combined with 
the Cosmological with singular force as follows: 

We have the idea of the perfect and absolute Being; 
and it comes to us, not as a freak of the imagination, but 
either as an intuition or a necessary inference. If there 
is no such Being, whence came the idea of Him to the 
human mind? How could it ever have arisen in human 



Ontological Argument 63 

thought ? Nothing can rise higher than its source ; noth- 
ing can be evolved that was not previously involved. 
Therefore the only adequate explanation of our necessary 
idea of a perfect Being is the existence of that Being as 
the source and cause of the idea. 



CHAPTER VI 

MORAL ARGUMENT^ 

I. DEFINITION 

The Moral Argument is the proof of the divine exist- 
ence which is based on the moral constitution of man 
and the moral order of the world. 

II. RELATION TO COSMOLOGY 

There is a sense in which the Moral Argument might 
be regarded as a division of the Cosmological proof. The 
latter seeks to find the adequate cause for the cosmos, 
of which moral facts and phenomena are an integral part. 
Thus it might be thought that, in seeking for the adequate 
cause of morality, we are dealing purely and simply with 
the Cosmological Argument. However, there are four 
reasons why we believe the Moral Argument is suffi- 
ciently distinctive to deserve a place as a major division 
in our theistic system, co-ordinate with the other out- 
standing proofs. They are the following: 

1. Cosmology deals more largely with the cosmos as 
a physical system, and touches only incidentally on 
moral phenomena. 

2. The cardinal thought in the Cosmological Argu- 
ment is the view of the universe as contingent, finite 

I. See footnote i. Chapter III, and compare the several authors in loco. 
On this thesis Valentine, Balfour and Micou are especially cogent. 

64 



Moral Argument 65 

and dependent, and therefore as demanding a personal, 
self-existent and eternal Cause to bring it into being and 
to sustain it in all its parts and relations. The moral 
order of the world would not, therefore, belong element- 
ally to this conception. 

3. The ethical phenomenon is so unique in its very 
idea, involving conscience, freedom and moral distinc- 
tions, that it may well claim a place that is all its own 
among the theistic evidences. 

4. Morality is so large, important and vital a fact 
in the world of humanity, and is so decisive for human 
welfare, that it should not be assigned merely a minor 
place in a system of Theism. In making evaluations, 
moral data are of more importance than all the physical 
facts of the universe. The best and noblest thinking 
would say that the physical has been made for the sake of 
the moral and spiritual, not the reverse. The summum 
honum is ethical being and achievement, not merely pleas- 
ure and utility, whether physical or psychical. This being 
true, surely the argument for the divine existence derived 
from the moral data of the world deserves a major posi- 
tion; indeed, its importance would not permit it to be 
relegated to an inconspicuous or subordinate place. Even 
our highest conception of God must be that He is an 
ethical Being. Note the Trisagion of the Bible: "Holy, 
holy, holy art thou. Lord God Almighty." 

HI. STATEMENT OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. Man's Moral nature: 

( I ) That man has a moral constitution scarcely needs 
argument. He has a conscience faculty that discerns 
moral distinctions, creates a moral imperative within him. 



66 A System of Natural Theism 

r- 

and gives him a sense of responsibility to the law over 
him and the moral Personality back of the law. True joy 
comes to him only from right being and conduct; never 
from wrong. Moreover, the ethical phenomenon is prac- 
tically universal. There are no nations on the earth which 
do not have some sense of right and wrong. This fact is 
writ large on the human constitution everywhere. 

(2) Among ethicists there are differences of opinion 
as to the origin and nature of conscience, some holding 
that it is a distinct power of the human soul, innate and 
divinely implanted ; others maintain that it is an acquired 
power of functioning, the result of accumulated expe- 
riences. However, this diversity of view does not invali- 
date the fact of conscience, for, whatever may be its 
genesis, it persists everywhere in recognizing moral dis- 
tinctions, and is perhaps the most dominating factor in 
human life, especially in moulding the true character and 
securing the real advancement of the human race. 

(3) The fact of diversity of moral judgments among 
men does not nullify conscience or moral distinctions. 
That there is such variety of moral judgment must be 
admitted. Some tribes have practices that they regard 
as right, but that other nations condemn as entirely 
unethical. Even different individuals in civilized lands 
often subscribe to different moral codes, some condemn- 
ing what others approve. However, the fundamental or 
primary fact of moral distinctions still persists. The dif- 
ferences are only in the sphere of secondary moral judg- 
ments, not in the elemental realm of morality. There are 
no nations which utterly wipe out the difference between 
right and wrong. Even the pagan mother who sacrifices 
her babe to appease the gods does this because she thinks 



Moral Argument 67 

it is right. As soon as her moral judgment is corrected 
by Christian teaching, she ceases her heathen practice, 
and rejoices in the higher Hght that has broken into her 
benighted mind. This proves that, however moral judg- 
ments may be obscured, the primary fact of moral distinc- 
tions and a cognizing moral faculty still remain intact. 
It should also be remembered that many tribes have very 
erroneous ideas of scientific facts. This does not prove 
that the human mind does not have a real scientific fac- 
ulty, nor that there is no true basis for science in the 
cosmos. Indeed, it cannot be denied that some tribes 
which have exceedingly crude idea of physical science, 
yet possess surprisingly high moral standards. It is said 
that the virtue of the Zulu women puts to shame the low 
standards of sexual virtue that frequently obtain in 
so-called civilized communities.^ 

(4) That moral judgments are capable of improve- 
ment does not destroy the moral faculty in man. All 
man's faculties are imperfectly developed in the immature 
state, and must be cultivated. Nobody holds that, on this 
account, man has no intellectual powers. 

(5) Sometimes it is objected that conscience, after all, 
is not an infallible guide even in its own sphere, that of 
morality, which proves, the opponent asserts, that con- 
science is not an innate power of the human mind. But 
the argument is not vaHd. No human faculty is infallible 
even in its distinct sphere. Sense perception is not infal- 
lible in cognizing the objective world; the logical faculty 
is not infallible in pursuing the praxis of ratiocination; 
the scientific faculty is liable to err ; the memory is imper- 
fect; so with all the psychical powers. Yet no one, be- 

2. Valentine, "Theoretical Ethics," p. 44. 



68 A System of Natural Theism 

cause of this general fallibility, denies the reality of man's 
mental make-up and of its several functioning powers. 

(6) That a distinct moral faculty is native to the 
human mind is evident from the unique character of its 
perceptions and feelings. Moral phenomena are sui 
generis. Ethics deals with the distinct sphere of the right 
and the wrong, which is different from the sphere of the 
physical, the purely pleasurable and utilitarian, the logical, 
the scientific, the esthetic. The question, 'Ts it right?" 
is the problem of ethics, and differs in kind, and not 
merely in degree or quality, from all other questions. 
Now, conscience is the specialized faculty for discerning 
this peculiar body of facts, namely, the ethical phenomena, 
the right and the wrong. Its objects of discernment are 
different in kind from those of sense perception, mathe- 
matical demonstration, logical practice, etc. The ethical 
emotions are also distinct from those that are stirred by 
any other psychical cognitions, being the feelings of 
"ought," duty, moral approval, moral aversion, guilt and 
remorse. When you say, 'T feel that such a course is 
right," you delimit that feehng from every other feeling 
of which you are capable. All these facts prove conclu- 
sively that man has a moral constitution and a specific 
moral faculty or functioning power. 

(7) The outstanding and paramount character of 
moral phenomena help to prove the reality of man's moral 
nature. All true progress and civilization depend upon 
the recognition of moral distinctions and the practice of 
moral principles. Society itself could not cohere without 
such recognition and practice. Human government is 
based largely on the fact that man has an innate power of 



Moral Argument 69 

distinguishing between right and wrong. Otherwise all 
penal sanctions would be vain and foolish. 

(8) It is not likely that man would have been framed 
in a cosmos where moral phenomena are so universal, 
dominant and vitally important without being endued with 
a specialized faculty for apprehending them. In other 
ways he is wonderfully fitted into the cosmical order; so 
it is reasonable to believe that he is adapted to the moral 
order, and it is unreasonable to think that he is not. 

(9) At this place we cannot enter the discussion of 
the doctrine of the freedom of the will ; we must be con- 
tent to say that universal consciousness attests that the 
human will has the power of choice; that man is not 
merely an automaton. This being true, the fact of free- 
dom of choice connotes that man must be a moral being, 
with the power to elect either right or wrong. Therefore, 
he must have a faculty to discern the difference and 
antagonism between them. 

2. The moral order of the world : 

(i) No matter how we explain it, there is a power 
in the universe ''that makes for righteousness." It may 
not always appear on the surface, but profounder study 
of nature in its relation to human life and history always 
discloses the truth. We see virtue rewarded, and applaud 
it ; crime punished, and sanction it. History has a way of 
vindicating the right even though sometimes tardily. No 
bad man is ever honored long by succeeding generations, 
whereas the men who have wrought for right principles 
are held in grateful esteem. "The memory of the right- 
eous is blessed; but the name of the wicked shall rot" 
(Prov. 10:7). 



70 A System of Natural Theism 

(2) Society and government are based on a moral 
order; otherwise, they could not exist. 

(3) There are also natural consequences of right and 
wrong conduct, thus proving a moral order — at least, that 
the natural realm has been fitted to sustain and advance 
the ethical law. The debauchee sooner or later suffers 
the consequences of his immoral life, and he and others 
recognize his sufferings as condign retribution. On the 
other hand, the physically virtuous man is free from those 
sufferings which are intuitively regarded as penal. If he 
must suffer pain, it is generally looked upon as a natural 
consequence or a disciplinary measure, and not as a puni- 
tive affliction. And when sufferings are visited upon the 
innocent, men usually feel that it is a temporary wrong 
for which ample compensation will be made in the future 
life, when equity and justice shall prevail; when there 
shall be "new heavens and a new earth, wherein dwelleth 
righteousness" (2 Pet. 3: 13). 

(4) The world (and this includes both the natural 
and the human realms) is so constituted as to give man 
constant opportunity to choose between right and wrong. 
For example, here are two paths which a man may pur- 
sue — the one may lead to the house of sin, the other to 
the house of worship. The man has the power of option 
between the two. What stronger proof could there be 
that the natural realm is itself so constituted as to furnish 
an arena for moral action and achievement? 

3. A moral economy demands a personal Creator 
and Governor: 

(i) The moral could never have evolved from the 
non-moral merely by means of natural or resident forces. 
If the doctrine of evolution is true at all, it postulates 



Moral Argument 71 

a moral Being at the beginning of the process who in- 
volved seminally all the facts and principles that were 
subsequently evolved. 

(2) Moral qualities can be predicated only of persons. 
You cannot correctly assign moral attributes to a thing or 
an animal. Rational personality alone can constitute 
moral agency. Hence the ultimate ground of all moral 
data must be a Person — God. 

(3) Man's feeling of responsibility connotes a per- 
sonal Being to whom he is amenable. Man cannot have 
a sense of responsibility merely to an abstract law, if 
there is no lawgiver and executor back of it. Think of 
the absurdity of a man saying, "I feel that I must some 
day give an account to the laws of nature!" Much 
more rational and profound is the teaching of the great- 
est ethical book in the world: "So then every one of 
us shall give account of himself unto God" (Rom. 
14:12). 

(4) The injustice and inequality now so apparent in 
the world demand an all-wise and righteous Being who 
will sometime right every wrong and usher in the ulti- 
mate triumph and reign of truth and justice. Without 
such a belief men must conclude that they live in a world 
of insoluble riddles, without any hope that they shall ever 
be deciphered. Such pessimism and hopelessness do not 
agree with the almost universal feeling of a golden age 
to come. Moreover, it would not agree with the patent 
fact that the world is a cosmos, that it has a moral order, 
and that man, its chief denizen, is an ethical being. 

(5) A profound philosopher like Kant, who could 
not appreciate the force of the other theistic arguments, 
was convinced of the divine existence through the Moral 



72 A System of Natural Theism 

Argument. The gist of his teaching was this : Man's con- 
science feels the moral imperative within it and over it, 
and this so powerfully that it cannot be evaded; but a 
moral imperative connotes an objective moral law; an 
objective moral law can be accounted for only by a real 
moral Personality who is its ground, source, author and 
administrant. To the man who has not stultified his con- 
science by wrong thinking or wrong doing, or both, the 
argument of the great critical philosopher surely must be 
convincing. 

(6) Theism affords an adequate explanation of the 
moral phenomena of the world. In positing an infinite 
and perfect moral Personality back of the universe as its 
Creator and Ruler, it certainly assigns a sufficient cause 
for all moral data and developments. No other concep- 
tion is adequate. Surely Materialism, Pantheism and 
Agnosticism are not adequate. Therefore, Theism is the 
most scientific hypothesis. 

(7) In order to be as thorough -going as possible in 
our argument, we must here take note of an objection 
that the skeptic is likely to raise : There is wrong in the 
world as well as right, immorality as well as morality. 
Must not wrong, therefore, have an eternal basis in fact? 
How could it ever have evolved if it is not eternal in 
seminal form? 

Reply: Right and wrong are not entities, but quali- 
ties. And they are qualities of certain kinds of entities, 
namely, rational personalities. Now right is a positive 
quality; therefore, as soon as there is a rational person, 
he must be a moral being, if there is to be a moral econ- 
omy; and we have already proved that the world is such 
an economy. However, wrong, being only a negative 



Moral Argument 73 

quality, that is, the negation of the right, it is not a 
necessary quahty of a personal being. In a moral uni- 
verse the wrong is only an eternal possibility, and is 
contingent on the choice of a free being. A being who 
is not free would not be an ethical being; he would be a 
machine or automaton. As a free being, it is possible 
for him to do wrong, but not necessary, for were it nec- 
essary, he would not be a free being. Thus we see that 
wrong is not necessarily existent from eternity, but is 
only a possibility contingent on free choice — a possibility 
which God never desired should become an actuality, but 
which He could not prevent by force and yet leave man 
a moral agent. Thus we say that wrong is not an eter- 
nal actuality, but only an eternal possibility. In this prin- 
ciple lies the uniqueness of ethical facts ; they are depend- 
ent on the initiating power of free will ; otherwise there 
could be no morality. 

Let us illustrate. In a certain class-room there is per- 
fect order. Does not that very fact, however, connote 
the possibility of disorder. But disorder is something 
that ought not to be made actual ; it ought to remain only 
a possibility. Again, suppose a student stands at the 
blackboard solving a problem in mathematics. There is 
a true way of solving it ; but that fact connotes the pos- 
sibility of error. However, he should avoid bringing the 
error into actuality. Just so in the moral sphere — except 
that a moral error is a great deal more serious than 
merely an intellectual error. 

So we say that the right, the moral, being a positive 
quality or attribute, must be an eternal fact dwelling in 
a moral personality, or it never could have brought forth 
a moral cosmos with moral beings ; but the wrong or the 



74 A System of Natural Theism 

immoral was only an eternal possibility, which should 
never have been converted into actuality. 

Should the objection be made that the eternal moral 
Personality — God — might have prevented the commission 
of the wrong, we reply : He could have done so only by 
destroying the freedom of the moral agents He had cre- 
ated, or by refraining from creating moral agents at all. 
Since man is in the world, and is a moral agent, we know 
that God created moral agents. In His wisdom He 
evidently knew that it was better to create moral beings 
than mere happy automata or mere material mechanisms. 
Since moral excellence is the noblest kind of excellence, 
the true ethicist cannot help approving God's choice and 
adventure. The man who says that God should not have 
made moral agents, but only automatically happy beings, 
proves by that very token that he has extremely crass 
moral ideals. He is a man who will "bear watching." He 
is an opportunist and an epicurean. 

4. Moral influence of Theism: 

( 1 ) Truth promotes human welfare ; error blights it. 
If Theism is found to be useful in the highest sense of the 
term, as it is, that fact is a cogent argument in its favor. 

(2) Belief in a God to whom men reahze that they 
are responsible and who takes pleasure in right doing and 
feels displeasure in wrong doing, must act as a stimulant 
to virtue and a deterrent to vice. History and experience 
prove that the clearer and stronger the belief in a personal 
God has been, the more salutary have been the results. 

(3) While atheism or agnosticism may construct some 
sort of an ethical system, it is most conspicuous for its 
failure, as, for example, Herbert Spencer's "Data of 
Ethics," where the ideas of right and wrong are resolved 



Moral Argument 75 

into mere utility and pleasure. Any system that thus 
interprets the ethical principles of the world cannot help 
lowering the standard of ethical practice, if generally 
accepted. 

(4) As a matter of fact, atheism leads to laxity of 
morals with individuals and communities. The atheists 
of a neighborhood are never its moral glory and inspira- 
tion ; they never help to bring about truly moral reforms, 
but are more apt to oppose them. The terrors of the 
French revolution might be taken as an example. Anarch- 
ists, nihilists, and other "dangerous classes" are almost 
invariably atheistic.^ On the other hand, the men who 
have really turned the currents of history and civilization 
upward have almost to a man been earnest and whole- 
hearted theists. As a rule, they have appealed to God 
to aid them in their unselfish moral endeavors. 

(5) If theists have ever been guilty of crimes, it was 
because they held gross and unethical conceptions of God. 
The history of the world furnishes scarcely an exception 
to the rule that men who have earnestly believed in the 
divine Being as the good and holy God to whom they were 
responsible have been men of upright and benevolent 
character. One might cite Moses, Samuel, Paul, and, in 
a still higher degree, Christ Himself, who believed in 
God and sought to do His will. 

3. Goldwin Smith: "The denial of the existence of God and of a future 
state is, in a word, the dethronement of conscience." Although this state- 
ment is cited in a footnote in Chapter I, it is quoted here again on account 
of its relevancy. 



CHAPTER VII 

ESTHETICAL ARGUMENT 

I. DEFINITION 

The Esthetical Argument^ is the argument for the 
divine existence which is based on the presence of beauty 
and subHmity in the universe. 

II. THE FACT OF BEAUTY 
1. In nature: 

There are beauty and sublimity in the natural realm. 
Let it be freely admitted that there is much in nature that 
is ugly and repulsive; much that is dreary and monoto- 
nous ; much that can be called neither attractive nor repel- 
lent. Yet, on the other hand, many parts of the natural 
realm are truly and even exquisitely lovely : the green of 
field, meadow and foliage; the variegated flowers; the 
undulating landscapes; the rivers and lakes sparkling in 
the sunshine; the glorious sunsets; the exquisite tinting 
of the plumage of many birds, especially of tanagers, 
humming birds and birds of Paradise; mountain scenery; 
the glory of the hills and valleys. All nature might have 
been made humdrum, but for some reason much of it has 
been arrayed in beauty and grandeur, and these attributes 

I. An eloquent chapter on the argument from the beautiful is found in 
Micou's "Basic Ideas in Religion." A. J. Balfour has also employed this 
proof with singular force and delicacy of style in his "Theism and Human- 
»m." 

7^ 



Esthetical Argument 77 

are adapted to stir a responding chord in the mind of 
man, causing him interest and deHght. 

2. In the human physique : 

No people appreciated the beauty of the human face 
and form more than did the Greeks, as their many works 
of art testify. The Venus de Milo is said to be the most 
truthful and beautiful repHca of the female form. The 
Apollo Belvedere is the classic representation of mascu- 
line beauty. It may be freely admitted that there are 
many people who are far from attractive, while others 
are repulsive; yet there is much physical attractiveness 
among men, women and children. We may well ask why 
there is physical human beauty at all. Such beauty also 
strikes a responsive chord in the mind of man. 

3. In human art : 

( 1 ) The productions of human skill in drawing, paint- 
ing and sculpturing all bear witness to the fact there 
is a large element of the esthetic in the world. Man 
might have been so constituted as to drag out a monoto- 
nous existence without such a means of delight and 
exhilaration. 

(2) Literature also betokens an element of beauty in 
the world. True, much writing is prosaic enough, and 
"of the making of books there is no end." However, 
there are such things as literary art, the beauty of style, 
the smoothness of diction, the exquisite turning of 
phrases, the delight of pure simplicity and limpidness, the 
rhyme and rhythm of poetry. Such appreciation is writ 
large on the human soul. We may well ask why. 

(3) In no human efforts is the fact of beauty more 
clearly evinced than in music. Listen to the sweet and 



78 A System of Natural Theism 

simple melody ; to the soul-stirring oratorio ; to the sweep- 
ing orchestra. Man might have been made without this 
capacity. Why was music put into his soul?^ 

III. MAN'S ESTHETIC FACULTY 

To correspond with, and respond to, all the beauty in 
the world, man has an esthetic capacity. His eye sees 
the marvelous colors on the evening sky, or the profound 
depths of the starlit dome at night, and there is some- 
thing in his soul that appreciates. His eye alone could 
not feel such a thrill and uplift. He feels that it is a 
spiritual emotion. The same is true of his delight in all 
forms of beauty. While there are persons who are unre- 
sponsive to the appeal of beauty, there are multitudes 
whose chief pleasure in life is admiration of beauty in its 
varied forms and phenomena. The horse and the dog, 
however intelligent in other ways, show no appreciation 
of beauty, though they may at times be frightened by the 
terrible. Stand with your well-trained family horse on 
a hilltop, and try to interest him in the glory of the sun- 
set ; you will find that, if he notes it at all, he has no means 
of showing his appreciation. He has not been endued 
with the esthetic faculty. 

IV. THE RATIONAL INFERENCE 
1. Evidence of design: 

Since so much beauty and grandeur mark the universe, 
and since man has a natural esthetic taste to match them, 
the rational conclusion is that the cosmical beauty and 
man's taste must have been designed to complement each 

2. We also speak of moral beauty by which we mean true moral excel- 
lence and symmetry. However, it is perhaps only a figure of speech. 



Esthetical Argument 79 

other. If this is not true, the universe has not been con- 
structed on rational principles. Then how can it be a 
cosmos instead of a chaos ? And how can it be intelligible 
to reason ? However, if there was intentionality in fitting 
together the beauty of the cosmos and man's esthetic fac- 
ulty, intentionality connotes intelligence and will, which 
in turn connote personality. Therefore, the designer 
must be a Person — God. 

2. Evidence of beneficent design: 

The universe might have been made a dreary waste, 
and man might have been created without esthetic appre- 
ciation. But how dull and monotonous would have been 
his existence ! For what other reason, then, could beauty 
have been added to the cosmos than for man's delight? 
For what other reason could his taste for the beautiful 
have been given him? But such a purpose connotes, 
not only a personal Designer, but also a beneficent one. 
Hence reason drives us back to God as the intelligent 
cause of the esthetic element in the world and the esthetic 
taste in man. 

3. Evidence of divine love of the beautiful: 
There is much beauty in the world that is never seen 

by man. "Full many a flower is born to blush unseen," 
etc. In most out-of-the-way localities there is most ex- 
quisite beauty, and doubtless has been for centuries, for 
the moment man discovers it unexpectedly, it is there in 
its completeness, not adding to its pristine beauty because 
of his presence. How many rare flowers have bloomed 
and perished; how many lovely shells and plants have 
existed for centuries at the bottom of the sea ; how many 
consummately beautiful birds have lived and died; how 



80 A System of Natural Theism 

many delicately tinted sunsets have flamed and faded — 
all of them before a human eye could behold them and a 
human soul rejoice in them ! Then why all this unnoted 
beauty? Ah! was it unnoted? What is its rationale? 
Was it merely an age-long waste ? Was so much beauty 
created without a purpose? Suppose we simply assume 
that there is a Creator and Preserver who, like ourselves, 
loves the beautiful in all its forms, would not that assump- 
tion offer a rational explanation of all the phenomenal 
beauty and magnificence there are in the world? If this 
is not the true explication, there is none that is rational 
and adequate. Hence both teleology and cosmology in 
the realm of beauty point indubitably to a personal 
Creator and Sustainer. 

Here we must add that many objects that to human ken 
at first seem to be repellent are found, on closer investi- 
gation, to be rarely fascinating. Look at a toad's skin 
through a microscope, and note that it sparkles with gems 
of many facets. The same is true of a common pebble. 
The skin of the serpent is set with many diamonds. Per- 
haps when we come to see nature "face to face," we shall 
find that all her forms are beautiful. Even the atoms 
and electrons, and also the universal ether itself, may be 
made with rarely beautiful forms and colored with ex- 
quisite tints. Who knows but this may be the meaning of 
the New Testament Apocalypse, which speaks of the 
jasper walls, gates of pearl, golden streets, river and tree 
of life, and alabaster throne of the New Jerusalem? 
However that may be, the rational explanation of the 
unseen beauty in the world is that God Himself sees and 
appreciates it. Add to this the arguments in the preced- 
ing sections, namely, that God endowed man with the 



Esthetical Argument 81 

esthetic faculty to mate with the beauty in nature, and you 
have ample reason for believing in a beneficent and beauty- 
loving Ordainer; and reason, too, that is founded, not 
merely on sentiment, but also on scientific processes of 
thought. 

4. Purpose of the repulsive: 

(i) The skeptic is apt to raise the objection that there 
is much in the world that is disagreeable. Hence, pass- 
ing by all the beautiful and sublime in the world, he sees 
only the offensive, becomes pessimistic, and either denies 
that there is a God, or questions His goodness and love. 
It may be frankly admitted that the presence of the 
offensive in the world, and that in large amounts, is in 
many respects a mystery ; and perhaps no explanation can 
be given that will satisfy all minds. Yet so many amelio- 
rating explanations of the difiiculty may be given that 
there is no sufficient reason to become atheistic or pessi- 
mistic over the problem. 

(2) The commonplace accentuates the interesting, 
and the repellent brings out more sharply the beautiful. 
Whatever might be the case in a perfect world, tenanted 
by perfect people, we know that in the world as it is we 
have a keener appreciation of the beautiful because of the 
presence of its opposite. After riding on the train for 
hours over the dreary, monotonous plains of the West, 
how you exclaim with delight when you suddenly come 
upon an irrigated area gleaming in rich and variegated 
hues in the sun ! Formed as we are, therefore, we appre- 
ciate beauty all the more by way of contrast. 

(3) After all, as has been said (section 3 above), all 
things may be beautiful in their essence, even the univer- 



82 A System of Natural Theism 

sal ether, the electrons and the atoms. It may be that 
it is only the temporary functioning and condition of 
some parts of nature that are offensive in our present 
limited status. 

(4) There is very likely a moral purpose in the dis- 
agreeable and difficult. Object as we will to the present 
order of the world, we know that many of the finest, and 
especially the sturdiest and most heroic, virtues are pos- 
sible only in a world of struggle. Certainly if all nature 
were beautiful, pleasant and prolific in itself, there would 
be no chance to develop the noble virtues of diligence, 
bravery, patience, initiative and enterprise. Morally all 
men would be weak and supine. Now, if true moral 
excellence is the highest quality in the world, men ought 
not to find fault with the very regime that gives oppor- 
tunity for its achievement. Therefore it would seem that 
the Creator, being a moral Being Himself and desiring 
His world to be a moral economy, was profoundly wise 
in making the cosmos just as it is — with enough of the 
good and beautiful to stimulate man, and prevent his 
being daunted and overcome, and yet enough of the hard 
and unbeautiful to test and discipline his moral powers. 
Will the skeptic tell us what kind of regime could have 
accomplished this exalted purpose so effectively as the 
present one? 

(5) On theistic grounds there is a sure hope that 
sometime the problem of the commonplace and repellent 
will, like all the other puzzling problems of our mundane 
existence, be solved; for if there is a God who is good 
and beneficent, He will not forever leave the questions of 
the soul remain unanswered. On the other hand, the 
Atheist and Materialist have no such prospect ; according 



Esthetical Argument 83 

to their theory, all men will sooner or later die and sink 
into eternal oblivion. Here the words of a great Book 
are assuring: "Now we see in a glass darkly; but then 
face to face: now we know in part; but then we shall 
know even also as we are known" (i Cor. 13:12). 

5. Purpose of the sublime: 

A few words should be added on this thesis. Nature 
is sometimes grandly beautiful; she stirs within us feel- 
ings of reverence, worship and awe. The Alpine heights, 
the deep canons, the majestic sweep of the storm, the 
glory of the starlit heavens at night — all beget within us 
these noble emotions. Now what is the obvious purpose 
of the sublime in nature ? Is not to stir in man's soul the 
emotions that have been mentioned ? Can any other pur- 
pose be named? At all events, that purpose is accom- 
plished, and man is made better and happier thereby. If 
such is the purpose of the sublime in the universe, there 
must have been a personal Creator who held the purpose 
in mind and carried it out in the structure of the world. 
Who knows but that the Psalmist assigned the highest 
possible reason for sublimity and majesty in the universe 
when he exclaimed : "The heavens declare the glory of 
God, and the firmament showeth His handiwork'^ (Ps. 
19:1)? Yes ; if the universe is constructed on a rational 
plan at all, and is not a mere idle and purposeless mech- 
anism, the argument for the divine existence from the 
sublime and the beautiful is vindicated. The alternatives 
of a rational universe or an irrational one are set before 
every thinker, and he must make his choice. 



PART III 
ANTI-THEISTIC THEORIES^ 

CHAPTER VIII 

ATHEISM AND MATERIALISM 

I. DEFINITIONS 

1. 0£ Atheism: 

Atheism is the teaching that there is no God. It is mere 
negation, and therefore is no science or philosophy. 

2. Of Materialism: 

Materialism is the teaching that the only entity is 
material substance. 

3. Distinction between Atheism and Materialism: 

Materialism is simply the positive pole of Atheism; in 
addition to the mere negation of the divine existence, 
Materialism asserts positively that the only entity is mate- 
rial substance, which is the source, basis and explanation 
of all things. It is pure materialistic monism. All 
materialists are atheists, and all atheists who make any 
positive assertions are materialists; hence in confuting 
the errors of the one class we confute those of the 
other. 

I. The classical work on all these defective world-views is Flint's "Anti- 
Theistic Theories." 

84 



Atheism and Materialism 85 

11. ERRORS OF MATERIALISM^ 

1. It is superficial: 

It stops with material substance, whereas thought can 
readily go back further — to a Supreme Personal God, 
who is the inteUigent Creator and Preserver. But fur- 
ther back than Theism goes thought cannot travel without 
being lost in an unending series resting on nothing. The 
ultima thule of human thinking is the self-existent, per- 
sonal Being we call God. 

2. It is based on chance: 

If there is nothing but material substance; if there is 
no creative and superintending Intelligence back of the 
universe, it must be a mere happen-so, a mere fortuitous 
concourse of things and events. But the world is a cos- 
mos, not a chaos. How could chance ever produce a 
world whose most dominating principle is that of order 
and law? That would be tantamount to bringing some- 
thing out of nothing. It would make the effect greater 
than the cause.^ 

3. It is opposed to the most universal belief of 
mankind : 

All nations are theistic. There is not a nation or tribe 
that is atheistic. If there is no God, nothing but material 
substance, how does it occur that almost all men believe 
in God? Could mere material substance, by means of 
mere resident forces, ever produce or evolve even the 

a. Consult the following: Sheldon, "Unbelief in the Nineteenth Cen- 
tury," pp. 42-77; Orr, "The Christian View of God and the World," pp. 143- 
150, 402, 403; Fisher, "The Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief," pp. 
68-72; Christlieb, "Modern Doubt and Christian Belief," pp. 145-161; 
Micou, "Basic Ideas in Religion," pp. 207-229, and other referencei; Harris, 
"The Philosophic Basis of Theism," pp. 428-554 (profound). 

3. Vidt Micou, ut supra, pp. 21 3f. 



86 A System of Natural Theism 

idea of God ? How much less so universal and dominant 
an idea, so persistent a conviction! If material sub- 
stance causes all men to believe there is a God when 
there is none, then material substance must be a uni- 
versal liar. 

4. Materialism makes the world eternal: 

The world cannot be eternal and uncreated for three 
reasons: (i) It is finite, contingent and dependent, be- 
cause all its parts are so, as we have shown in a pre- 
vious thesis, and therefore it cannot be self-existent, abso- 
lute and eternal. (2) It is a developing universe; so de- 
clared to be by the science of the day; therefore it must 
have had a beginning, because if it were eternal and yet 
developing, it should have reached its present stage of 
evolution long ago, for it had eternity in which to unfold 
and progress. That which develops must have had a 
beginning; only that which is perfect and self-existent 
can be eternal. Therefore in positing the material world 
as eternal. Materialism is irrational. (3) The science 
of the day goes back to beginnings, and finds them. It 
teaches that there was a time when man, animals and vege- 
tables began to be ; when the present form of the universe 
had its genesis. Reasoning by analogy, we may conclude 
that material substance itself did not always exist, but 
had a beginning in time. 

5. Materialism is unscientific because inadequate: 

It offers no adequate explanation of the advent of the 
following phenomena of the universe: Matter, force, 
life, sentiency, consciousness, freedom, morality, spiritu- 
ality. These are the outstanding facts, those that are 
crucial in working out a philosophy. A hypothesis that 



Atheism and Materialism 87 

does not afford an adequate solution of any of the vital 
problems raised by the human mind is surely neither 
scientific nor philosophical. It fails precisely where it 
ought to show its strength and sufficiency. Compare the 
hypothesis of Theism, which offers an adequate explana- 
tion of all the facts and phenomena of the universe, be- 
cause it places a sufficient foundation under the whole 
structure. 

6. Materialism is unpsychological : 

It denies the reality of mind, and attributes thought 
to mere brain secretion and molecular action. Feuerbach 
asserts: "Man is what he eats." Says Cabanis: "The 
brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile." Here 
is the dictum of Carl Vogt : "As contraction is the func- 
tion of muscles, and as the kidneys secrete urine, so, and 
in the same way, does the brain generate thoughts, move- 
ments and feelings." 

Let us for a moment scrutinize the second of these 
statements, for all three mean the same thing. The liver 
secretes bile. True enough ; but the bile secreted by the 
liver is material substance, just as the liver itself is mate- 
rial substance. Not so with thought, which, while it 
has its connection with the brain, is not material at all, 
is not even a thing, an entity, but purely a psychical prod- 
uct and function. Bile and thought are so different in 
their very nature that they belong to entirely different 
categories. It is a sign of crude and superficial think- 
ing to put them into the same class. Bile is a substance ; 
thought is only a function of a substance. Bile is inert ; 
thought is self-moving. Bile is unconscious; thought is 
conscious. Bile is visible, palpable; thought and mind 



88 A System of Natural Theism 

are invisible, impalpable. They are utterly different. If 
the brain as mere material substance produces mind and 
thought, then the effect is greater than the cause, and we 
have another case of something coming from nothing. 
Here again the maxim, ex nihilo nihil fit, must be applied. 
No ; mind and matter are different quiddities ; yet they are 
vitally united in human beings by an all-wise Creator 
for a clear, definite and exalted purpose. While by an 
empirical mode of reasoning we cannot explain the won- 
derful connection between mind and matter, the philos- 
ophy of dualism has the decided advantage that it assigns 
an adequate cause for all the known effects. 

7. Moral weakness o£ Materialism': 

(i) It virtually destroys the validity of moral distinc- 
tions, and affords no true and adequate ground of right; 
for if there is no moral Person back of and in the uni- 
verse, what makes one thing right and another wrong? 
Hence Materialism, if generally accepted, would have a 
pernicious effect on individuals and society. 

(2) It affords no comfort and hope in sorrow, and 
would therefore lead to ennui and pessimism; which 
would also be harmful in their practical effects on the 
race. 

(3) It nullifies all expectation of personal and con- 
scious immortality, and hence affords no ray of hope of 
the ultimate solution of man's many perplexing prob- 
lems; no hope that the wrongs of life will ever be made 
right. Such hopelessness would surely be morally 
depleting. 

(4) In its very nature it is crass and debasing; of the 
earth, earthy; tending to destroy the higher and nobler 



Atheism and Materialism 89 

aspirations of the soul. As a matter of fact, the material- 
istic schools do not uphold a high standard of morality, 
but are disposed to be hedonists in ethics. "Ye shall 
know them by their fruits." In a word, for moral uplift 
and exhilaration Materiahsm will bear no comparison 
with Theism. 



CHAPTER IX 

DEISM 

I. EXPLANATION 

1. Definition: 

Deism is the view that God created the universe, then 
forsook it, and relinquished it to the operation of second- 
ary causes. 

2. Derivation o£ term: 

The word Deism is derived from the Latin Deus, God. 
Its etymology does not give a clue to its peculiar tech- 
nical meaning in scientific works. See next division. 

3. Technical meaning: 

Deism believes in a personal God as the Creator of the 
universe with all its laws. However, it holds that, after 
creating the universe, God gave it over to the control 
of those laws. Hence it denies the divine immanence 
and providence, and is especially opposed to the doc- 
trine of a special divine revelation, such as we have in 
the Bible, and contends that the light of nature and rea- 
son is sufficient for man's guidance. It advocates the 
so-called "religion of nature," that is, that a study of 
nature gives to man all the light he needs to make him a 
truly religious being. 

90 



Deism 91 

4. Comparison with Theism: 

The word Deism is derived from the Latin word for 
God,, w^hile Theism is derived from the Greek. So far, 
therefore, as their etymologies are concerned, Deism and 
Theism might mean the same thing. However, in scien- 
tific and philosophical works these words have come to 
have a technical significance. The two views agree in 
holding that God is a personal Being and that he created 
the heavens and the earth ; they differ in this : Deism re- 
jects the doctrine of the divine immanence and superin- 
tendence, while Theism accepts and tipholds them. 

5. Historical note: 

In its technical sense, Deism arose in England in the 
closing decades of the seventeenth century, and continued 
to flourish throughout the eighteenth century. Among 
its chief proponents were Lord Herbert, Tindal, Shafts- 
bury, Bolingbroke and Collins in England, and Thomas 
Paine in America. While all Deists believed in God as 
the Creator and in ''the religion of nature," many of them 
were especially bitter in their hostility to the Bible. 
Hence they were usually known as "infidels," and some- 
times as "freethinkers." In more recent times, however, 
these terms are applied to all classes of persons who re- 
ject the Holy Scriptures as a special divine revelation. 
Near the close of the eighteenth century Deism had run 
its course as a movement, and developed into the univer- 
sal skepticism of Hume and Gibbon, although here and 
there were practical Deists all along, and there are some 
today. There is good historical evidence that English 
Deism was carried into France by Voltaire, and thence 
by him into Germany during the time of Frederick the 



92 A System of Natural Theism 

Great. In France it became atheistic and materialistic, 
and in Germany it developed into Rationalism.^ 

11. ERRORS 

1. It is unreasonable to believe that God would create 
the world, especially one containing sentient and rational 
beings, and then sever His connection with it. If His 
creatures should fall into error and trouble, it is rational 
to believe that He would come to their rescue, and even 
give to them a special revelation of a way of escape. No 
true human father would forsake his children as the De- 
ists assert that God has forsaken His creation. It is far 
more reasonable to believe what we read in the greatest 
theistic book in the world : "If ye then, being evil, know 
how to give good gifts unto your children, how much 
more shall your Father who is in heaven give good things 
to them that ask Him" (Matt. 7:11)? 

2. Men would soon lose their interest in and respect 
for a God who had so little solicitude for them as to leave 
them alone in their struggles and temptations. An ab- 
sentee God would soon be forgotten. 

3. Hence, as a matter of fact. Deism has proved a 
failure morally and spiritually, for it has done little, if 
anything, to uplift humanity. It has evinced little power 
even to keep many of its advocates in the paths of com- 
mon virtue, as is obvious from an account of their prin- 
ciples and lives.^ 

4. Historically it has always shown a tendency to 
degenerate into Atheism, Pantheism and Agnosticism. 
This tendency is perfectly natural, for men cannot long 

1. Cf. John Urquhart, "The Inspiration and Accuracy of the Holy 
Scriptures," pp. 142-144. 

2. Gf. Home, "Introduction," Vol. i, pp. 22-26. 



Deism 93 

rest in the conception of a merely transcendent Being 
who shows no interest in their welfare. Hence they are 
apt ultimately to conclude that they would rather believe 
in no personal God at all than in a God like that. 

5. Philosophically Deism is wrongly based; for the 
universe, being finite and contingent (as we have already 
proved), cannot be independent; cannot in the very 
nature of the case uphold itself; therefore God, who 
created it, must continue to sustain it. 

6. Scientifically considered, the cosmos is not an en- 
tity that has within itself the power of sustentation. It 
is made up of finite particles ; therefore as a whole it must 
be finite; its parts are each and all dependent; therefore 
it must as a whole be dependent. The scientific 
doctrine of the radiation of energy points to the fact 
that in and of itself the universe would finally waste away. 
Therefore it must be continuously dependent upon a 
Being who is infinite in all His attributes and resources, 
and who must, therefore, sustain an interested, intelligent 
and vital relation to it. 

Thus Deism as a world-view is not based on scientific, 
philosophical and rational principles.^ 

3. An incisive critique on Deism is found in Christlieb, "Modern Doubt 
and Christian Belief," pp. 190-209. 



CHAPTER X 

PANTHEISM^ 

I. EXPLANATIONS 

1. Etymology of term: 

Pantheism is derived from the Greek : Trav, all, and ©eos, 
God. 

2. Definition : 

Pantheism is the philosophy that identifies God and the 
world: the world is God and God is the world; God is 
the All and the All is God. It especially negates the trans- 
cendence and personality of God, and insists on the doc- 
trine that He is only immanent. 

3. Classes of Pantheists: 

Some so-called Pantheists can scarcely be distinguished 
from the Materialists, save that they speak of an in- 
tangible, indwelling principle or spirit which acts very 
like an intelligent something. Other Pantheists veer 
toward Idealism, practically denying that material sub- 
stance is a real quiddity, but is, rather, an illusion of the 
mind. The Pantheism of Spinoza, which is perhaps the 
most conspicuous type, is purely monistic, teaching that 

I. On Pantheism consult the following: Christlieb, "Modern Doubt," 
etc., pp. 161-190; Micou, "Basic Ideas in Religion," 178-187, and many 
other references; Orr, "The Christian View," etc., pp. 49-59, 84, 368, 402; 
Fisher, "The Grounds," etc., pp. 63-67, 138, 398. 

94 



Pantheism 95 

there is only one substance, which has two attributes, 
thought and extension, the former displaying the phe- 
nomena of mind, the latter those of matter. 

II. ITS FUNDAMENTAL DEFECTS 

1. It is too vague and abstruse to be of practical 
value as a world-view or philosophy. Who can obtain a 
clear conception of a theory that calls the universe God 
and God the universe? The universe is not a personal 
entity. Then how can it be called God? Thus it will be 
seen that in trying to get a conception of the theory, 
thought simply vapors off into mistiness. Then take the 
idea of the divine immanence on which Pantheism ever 
insists; how can God be the universe and at the same 
time immanent in it? If He is immanent, He must be 
something different from the universe. A thing cannot 
be immanent in itself, because it is itself. Hence Panthe- 
ism uses terms without meaning. Consider, again, Spi- 
noza's fundamental idea, that of one substance with its 
two attributes; what a hazy idea presents itself to the 
mind when you speak of a substance that has two such 
attributes as thought and extension? How can an at- 
tribute like thought give rise to an entity like mind? 
Is it not clearer and more rational to believe that mind 
is the basis of thought than the reverse? Can there be 
an attribute before there is an entity? The same argu- 
ment holds with regard to extension. A substance whose 
chief attribute is extension surely could not give reality 
to all the various forms of the material world. A world- 
view that is so indeterminate is not likely to be true. Com- 
pare with it the clearly defitied conceptions of Theism. 

2. Pantheism forces matter and mind into one sub- 



96 A System of Natural Theism 

stance. It is unscientific thus to manipulate two different 
quiddities, especially without giving a fundamentally 
reasoned basis for such treatment. That matter and 
mind are different entities may be seen from their phe- 
nomena. You cannot convert terms of materiality into 
terms of mentality. Matter has no consciousness; mind 
has. Matter is not sentient; mind is. Matter does not 
think and reason; mind does. Matter is inert; mind is 
self-moving, self-determining. Matter has no person- 
ality, never says "I"; mind has egoity, and says "I". 
Matter has no conscience, no morality ; mind has. Matter 
has no spiritual consciousness and quality ; mind is spirit- 
ually active and conscious. Thus it will be seen that 
matter and mind do not belong to the same category. 
They are marvellously joined and related, but they are 
different in quality and essence. Hence to force them 
into one substance, as Pantheism tries to do, is unscientific 
and irrational. The old aphorism, "What is matter? 
Never mind; what is mind? No matter," even though 
meant to be facetious, expresses a fundamental and un- 
alterable truth. 

3. Somewhat wedded to the merely phenomenalistic 
view of the world, Pantheism professedly denies the 
category of cause and effect, and yet is constantly com- 
pelled to use terms that mean the same thing. Thus it 
is fundamentally inconsistent in this respect. 

4. It does not solve the ultimate problem of being 
(Ontology), but leaves it as great a mystery as ever. For 
example, what is the ultimate "Substance" of Spinoza, 
which has the two remarkable attributes of thought and 
extension? Is it mental stuff or material stuff, or is it 
merely a "thingless thing" ? These are serious questions, 



Pantheism 97 

and are not meant to be humorous or sarcastic. Thus 
Pantheism does not solve the ultimate problem of On- 
tology, and in this respect has no advantage over Theism, 
while it fails, as Theism does not, to afford an adequate 
explanation of the varied phenomena in the material and 
psychical realms. 

5. It assumes that there is thought in the cosmos, in- 
telligence, design; and yet it negates three essential 
elements of thought, namely, self-consciousness, feel- 
ing and will. In this respect it proves itself an irra- 
tional and insufficient world-view. 

6. In trying to explain the evidences of thought in the 
universe, it reasons from the attributes it finds in the 
human personality, and yet denies personality to the 
ultimate Thinker, who has at least unfolded the cosmos 
in an intelligent way. Here again it punctures its own 
philosophy. 

7. It mistakes the very nature of absolute person- 
ality by contending that personality implies limitation. 
This is a profound problem, but deep thinking leads to 
the conclusion that the only kind of entity that can be 
infinite is spiritual personality. The spiritual, or, in 
other words, the psychical, cannot be put into the cate- 
gories of material substance, which has spatial exten- 
sion and limitation, and therefore must be finite and de- 
pendent ; for whatever mind is as an entity or essence, its 
attribute of thought has no spatial limitation, but can 
project itself, by means of the imagination, even beyond 
the boundaries of the physical universe. Therefore we 
are not irrational in predicating infinity to the Absolute 
Spiritual Person, who must, by the very exigencies of 
thought itself, transcend the limits of the finite universe. 



98 A System of Natural Theism 

8. Here is a serious indictment against the moral 
character of Pantheism; it rejects the well-known fact 
of human freedom. It lands in pure determinism, and 
most pantheists not only do not deny this allegation, but 
rather argue strenuously against the freedom of the will, 
maintaining that the cosmos has developed as it has simply 
by inherent principles, and could have developed in no 
other way. Everything is just as it had to be. Some of 
the favorite phrases of this system of speculation are, 
"a predetermined will," ''a necessitated will." But such 
a will is no will at all,^ but a contradiction of terms, as 
if one were to speak of "coerced freedom." Now, a sys- 
tem that negates divine and human freedom destroys mo- 
rality by that very token. Then how shall we account for 
the universal fact of morality in the human realm, of 
conscience, of the sense of freedom? Could pure deter- 
minism ever by its own forces alone evolve into the 
consciousness of a will in liberty? Here again Pan- 
theism is "weighed in the balance and found wanting." 

9. By denying personality to God, Pantheism elimi- 
nates true religion; for man, being a person, can have 
real communion only with a personal God. Any other 
kind of communion than that which is personal is scarcely 
worthy of the name, and cannot rationally be called 
religious communion. 

10. Although Pantheists may claim a kind of mysti- 
cal relation to the impersonal All, and therefore may 
profess a feeling of comfort and inspiration in their 
system; yet their claim is not rationally based. How 
can the impersonal universe speak any words of com- 

a. On the freedom of the will, cf. Micou, ut supra, pp. 333-359. who it 
profound. 



Pantheism 99 

fort to the soul ? It does not know the soul's aspirations 
and sorrows ; therefore it cannot help and comfort. Men 
may sometimes get a kind of fanciful consolation from 
nature; but this comes only because by an effort of the 
imagination they put something into nature that their 
reason tells them is not there, if there is no personal God 
in and back of the natural world. 

11. Pantheism denies the doctrine of personal, con- 
scious immortality. According to this system, the in- 
dividual is simply re-absorbed into the impersonal and 
unconscious All. In this doctrine it corresponds with 
Hinduism, which was pantheistic centuries before mod- 
ern Pantheism came into vogue. Whatever else may 
be said of this system, there surely are no comfort and in- 
spiration in the doctrine of re-absorption. In this regard 
Pantheism is decidedly weak in comparison with Theism, 
especially Christian Theism. 

12. In the last place, Pantheism holds that the uni- 
verse, God, the All, comes to consciousness only in the 
personalities called men. This is both unscientific and 
a priori absurd, for how could the conscious ever evolve 
from an unconscious source? Here again would be a 
case of something coming from nothing; of water rising 
higher than its source. We insist on the fundamental 
truth: Ex nihilo nihil fit. Moreover, a consciousness 
that is broken up into innumerable fragments, each dis- 
tinct from the other, would be a poor kind of conscious- 
ness, and would be destitute of the unitary principle that is 
required in a true philosophy of the cosmos, which has 
written upon it everywhere unity of plan and purpose. 

Thus Pantheism will not stand the test of the rational 
process. 



CHAPTER XI 

IDEALISM^ 

I. DEFINITION AND DISTINCTIONS 

1. Definition: 

Idealism is the view that mind is the only entity ; hence 
that the material universe has no real objective existence, 
but is merely a subjective idea or illusion. 

2. Distinctions : 

(i) It is the antithesis of Materialism, which says 
the only quiddity is material substance. Some idealists 
are pantheistic; others are positive in their belief in a 
personal God.^ Our reason for including Idealism in the 
list of Anti-theistic Theories is that we believe true The- 
ism is dualistic and not monistic — that is, it holds that 
there are two kinds of entities, the material and the 
psychical-, or matter and mind, and that they are distinct, 
though vitally related. 

(2) In this work the term Idealism is used in the 
philosophical sense as above defined, namely, that mind 
is the only reality. The term is often used in what might 

1. Books to consult: Sheldon, "Unbelief in the Nineteenth Century," 
pp. 11-41; Micou, ut supra^ pp. 183-187, and other references in index; 
Keyset, "A System of Christian Ethics," pp. 190, 191; Lindsay, "Recent 
Advances," etc., many references in index. 

2. One of the best works advocating what might be called Theistic 
Idealism is Snowden's "The World a Spiritual System." Though not con- 
vincing to the present writer, he acknowledges the cogency and beauty of 
Dr. Snowden's presentation. 

100 



Idealism 101 

be called the ethical sense; in which sense it refers to 
high ideals or standards of excellence. The student should 
bear this distinction in mind. 

11. THE ARGUMENTS OF IDEALISM 

1. We do not know things in themselves (nou- 
mena) : 

This is the chief contention of the idealistic philosophy. 
It says we cognize only phenomena, not things per se. 
Take, for example, the sense of sight. We say we see 
a tree. However, we do not perceive the substance of the 
tree, if it has substance, but only the colors and form im- 
pinged upon the retina of the eye, which in some mys- 
terious way is borne by the optic nerve back into the 
brain, where it is transferred into the consciousness. 
Now, since we perceive only phenomena, we cannot prove 
by the empirical process that anything but phenomena 
really exist. The noumena which we think must exist 
may be only a "form of thought" projected by our minds. 
True, there seems to us to be a real objective tree there, 
but you cannot prove it, because you perceive nothing 
but the appearance, the phenomenon. Perhaps "things 
are not what they seem." 

In the idealistic system all the other senses are treated 
in the same way. You hear a sound, coming, as you 
think, from a bell; but really only certain undulations 
strike your tympanum, and are thence carried by the audi- 
tory nerve to the consciousness. In reality you know 
that only such an impression has been made upon your 
mind. You do not hear the bell itself. Therefore so 
far as your consciousness goes, you cannot prove the 
actual existence of the bell. Even if you were to go 



102 A System of Natural Theism 

near it, and look at it, you would perceive only its form 
and color. So if you were to feel it, your awareness 
would give you only the phenomena of hardness, coldness, 
roundness and roughness. The same is true, according 
to the argument of this system, regarding the sensations 
of taste and smell. It is the philosophy of pure phe- 
nomenalism. Kant and Comte advanced the same argu- 
ments, though the former was not an idealist, and the 
latter was an agnostic. 

2. We are subject to illusions: 

The idealistic system makes much of illusions. For 
instance, the mirage is an optical illusion. So far as our 
awareness goes for the time being, we really think there 
is a landscape where it appears; but afterward we find 
that it was only an optical illusion, an image on the rari- 
fied air of the plain or desert. So may not all our seeing 
be a mere illusion? What empirical proof have we 
that it is not? 

Again we think the sun rises and sets; that the sun, 
moon and stars swing around the earth, while our own 
globe is stationary. It is a clear illusion of our entire 
sensory cognition. Not only does sight testify that the 
earth is standing still, but we also feel that it is station- 
ary. Thus these two senses seem to concur in their 
testimony that the universe is geocentric. And yet the 
physical facts are contrary to the attestations of experi- 
ence. It is the earth that moves. So we cannot say that 
in every case "seeing is believing." 

The sense of hearing, too, is often deceptive. Some- 
times we think we have heard a sound when there was 
complete silence, and very often we hear inaccurately. 



Idealism 103 

3. Our mental constitution : 

Kant argued that the mind may be so constituted as 
to impose its ''own forms of thought" upon external 
objects. As we know only phenomena, we cannot be 
sure what the character of the real objects is, for the phe- 
nomena given off by objects must first pass through a 
mental process which may greatly modify them. So, 
while Kant did not deny objective reality — he was not 
an Idealist — his philosophy taught that objects may not 
be at all what they seem to be in our consciousness. From 
this position it was not a far step to the conclusion that 
there may be no objective reality, but only subjective im- 
pressions; and therefore mind may be the only entity. 

These are the arguments of Idealism. We must pro- 
ceed to examine them. 

III. FUNDAMENTAL ERRORS OF IDEALISM 

1. It is too speculative and obscure, and is there- 
fore of little practical value. While we would not advo- 
cate mere Pragmatism in philosophy, ethics or religion, 
yet a system that cannot be understood by the vast major- 
ity of people, and that is so obscure as to require a men- 
tal strain even on the part of disciplined minds to grasp 
its main position, is not likely to be the true view of the 
world. A true world-view, it is reasonable to suppose, 
would have some real practical value, and ought to be 
intelligible at least to the majority of the people. 

2. This theory makes the whole physical cosmos a 
chimera. We are not urging this as a final proof, yet 
it is hardly reasonable to suppose that so vast a universe 
of matter would exist only in the imagination ; would not 
be an actual world. It is almost incredible that there 



104 A System of Natural Theism 

should be so much more seeming in the universe than 
reality. 

3. The idealistic theory contradicts the universal 
human consciousness. With the exception of a few 
speculative philosophers, who live mostly in an academic 
atmosphere, all people believe in the objective reality 
of the physical world. In fact, most men never think of 
questioning its reality. Let a million men look at a tree, 
and without exception they would all declare that the 
tree is there and that it exists. While we are not offering 
this argument as absolute empirical proof, yet we would 
ask whether a philosophical system is likely to be true 
which is so patently opposed to the general experience of 
mankind. That certainly would make the universe an ir- 
rational one, to say the least. Why should the Power 
back of the universe inflict a general hallucination on 
the consciousness of mankind? A world-view ought 
to square with the outstanding facts of human 
experience. 

4. No man, not even the Idealist himself, can live, 
and conform his conduct to the principles of this 
system. All men have to frame their behavior on the 
basis of the reality of material things. They cannot 
treat material objects as if they were non-existent. A 
man cannot pass through a wall as if it were not there. 
People do not go right through trees and houses and 
mountains as if they were only freaks of the fancy. If 
a million people were to pass single-file along a path in 
the center of which there stood a large tree, every one of 
them would go around it, and treat it as if it were there. 
Then why should the speculatist adopt a philosophy that 
cannot be practiced even by himself ? It is hardly reason- 



Idealism 105 

able to think that so impractical a hypothesis would be 
the true one. 

5. IdeaHsm confuses illusions with actualities, and 
makes the exceptions the rule. Much of its argument is 
based on the illusions to which our senses are subject. 
However, these illusions are the exceptions, and ought 
not to be made the rule. Moreover, let us consider the 
exceptions. You will find that there are always ways 
of correcting our mistakes, and tracing back to the reali- 
ties. There, for example, is the mirage: first, it is a 
reality as a reflection or image on the air in certain 
meteorological conditions; second, it could not be there 
as an image if there were not a real landscape somewhere 
that produces it; third, if you will move nearer the 
mirage, it will presently disappear, and thus enable you 
to correct your error; fourth, when you approach a real 
landscape, it is found to be there, and is not a mere 
appearance. Therefore the argument from the mirage, 
so much used by Idealists, is valueless. 

The same is true of the apparent rising and setting of 
the sun. Science has been able to set men right in 
regard to the facts; but they have not thereby become 
convinced that the sun and earth have no actual exist- 
ence. If the sun and earth were not real, how could men 
have ever corrected the optical illusion? How would 
they know today that the earth revolves around the 
sun instead of the sun revolving around the earth? The 
very fact that an Idealist even speaks of an optical illu- 
sion connotes that he must believe in an optical reality. 

6. Let us look into the problem still more deeply. 
If the objective world has no reality, how can it 
produce phenomena? Can nothing have an appearance 



106 A System of Natural Theism 

of being something? If there is no tree out yonder in 
the campus, how can there be the epiphany of a tree? 
This must be a strange, chaotic, irrational world if 
there can be phenomena without noumena to produce 
them. An appearance is only an exhibition of quality; 
but there must be a something or there could be no 
quality. 

7. If the material world is not real, why does it 
invariably impinge upon man's consciousness as real? 
The most rational explanation of the mutual adaptation 
of the outer world to the inner human consciousness 
is that they were purposely made for each other. There 
is the outer world; here corresponding to it is the sub^ 
jective receptivity ; they seem to match each other, to be 
designed for each other. The eye is a highly specialized 
organ, marvellously contrived, for the very purpose of 
seeing the external world and enjoying its beauty and 
sublimity. So are all the senses organized, each for its 
own special purpose. 

8. Let us analyze sense-perception and its content 
in consciousness still more deeply, taking sight for our 
example. You think you see a tree out on the campus. 
The physicist tells you that in reality the image of the 
tree is formed on the retina of your eye by means of 
the light-rays; thence is conveyed by the optic nerve to 
the proper brain center, where, in some mysterious way, 
it is brought out into the field of consciousness. Now 
the Idealist declares that there is no tree, but only an 
illusory impression on the mind within. Then why- 
does the tree appear to be out on the campus? It 
ought to appear within the brain! According to the 
Idealist, the mind plays us very strange pranks. If 



Idealism 107 

so, what value can you attach to the Idealist's own proc- 
esses of reasoning? 

9. We shall take a simple object, and subject it to 
as many tests of sense-perception as possible, to see 
what the indubitable conclusion must be. Here is a red, 
ripe, mellow apple. First I see it; the sense of sight 
says it is an apple. Next I feel it, and find it round 
and smooth and mellow, and the sense of touch declares 
it is an apple. Then I lift it to my nose, and the sense 
of smell concurs that it is an apple. Now I thrum upon 
it with my fingers, and it gives forth a dull, thudding 
sound, and the sense of hearing agrees that it is an 
apple. Lastly I eat it, and the sense of taste asserts it 
is an apple. Thus all my senses bear the same testimony. 
Here the five senses positively asseverate and concur 
that the apple is a reality, not a chimera. If such con- 
current testimony is not valid, man has been constituted 
insane, not rational. 

10. Rejecting the plain testimony of consciousness, 
Idealism opens the way for the invalidation of all 
knowledge. This would make science and philosophy 
impossible, and render all thought processes nugatory 
and vain. 

11. There is real moral peril in the idealistic scheme. 
From the negation of the testimony of consciousness 
in sense-perception, it is only a step to the negation of 
the testimony of conscience, and the next step is the 
negation of moral distinctions. In brief. Idealism as a 
philosophy surrounds everything with an air of unreality, 
and is therefore dreamy and impractical, and thus tends 
to disqualify its advocates for true and earnest moral 
endeavor. 



CHAPTER XII 

NATURALISTIC EVOLUTION^ 

I. DEFINITIONS 

1. 0£ evolution in general: 

In general, evolution is the theory that the cosmos has 
been evolved from crude, homogeneous material to its 
present heterogeneous and advanced status by means 
of resident forces. 

2. Of theistic evolution: 

Theistic evolution is the view that God created the 
primordial material, and that evolution has since been 
His modus operandi in developing it to its present status. 
Natural Theism raises no objection to this view, except 
that it waits to see whether it can be scientifically proven 
or not. The author of this work does not believe that 
the scientific and rational proofs are sufficient to estab- 
lish the theory of theistic evolution properly so called, 
as will be seen later. 

3. Of atheistic (naturalistic) evolution: 

Atheistic evolution is the theory that denies the exist- 
ence of God, asserts the eternity of matter and force, 

I. Literature: Fairhurst, "Organic Evolution Considered;" Patterson, 
"The Other Side of Evolution;" Townsend, "The Collapse of Evolution;" 
Dennert, "At the Deathbed of Darwinism;" Sheldon, "Unbelief in the Nine- 
teenth Century," pp. 96-134; Orr, "The Christian View," etc., pp. 99-101, 
128, 176-185, 250, 251, 409-412, 415-418; Micou, "Basic Ideas,*' etc., pp. 69- 
99. 409-4.17, and many other references (consult index); Wright (Geo. F.), 
"Origin and Antiquity of Man." 

108 



Naturalistic Evolution 109 

and attributes the development of the cosmos to purely 
natural forces. 

11. ERRORS OF NATURALISTIC EVOLUTION 

1. All the arguments urged against Materialism in 
a former thesis apply here. A review of them might be 
profitable. 

2. Many noted scientists have rejected or do reject 
naturalistic evolution, among them : Agassiz, Dana, Gray, 
Lord Kelvin, Virchow, Sir William Dawson, J. W. Daw- 
son, Du Bois Raymond, Janet, John Fiske, and George 
Frederick Wright. 

3. Mere evolution cannot account for the origin of 
matter, force and motion. Should the argument be 
made that you have to assume these things in order to 
have a cosmos at all, we reply that you must also assume 
intelligence as necessarily as you must assume mat- 
ter, force and motion ; for the cosmos displays evidences 
of law, order and design as outstanding facts. Law, 
order and design connote intelligence, and intelligence 
demands a Person — therefore God. To endue matter 
with the intelligence necessary to produce and evolve the 
cosmos is the height of absurdity, for we know that mat- 
ter is not personal. 

4. Naturalistic evolution cannot account for the ori- 
gin of life. If, as most scientists today hold, the earth 
was once a molten or incandescent globe, no life — at least, 
no life as we know it today — could have existed upon 
it. In a blast furnace you see streams of molten ore 
flowing from immense melting pots. How many living 
germs would you say the fiery liquid contains? You 
know there could be none. So when the earth cooled 



110 A System of Natural Theism 

off, it could have contained no vital germs. There is today 
no scientific evidence of life from mere chemical action 
or from spontaneous generation. The law of biogenesis 
— that is, of life only from antecedent life — is the only 
biological law known to science. Then whence came 
life? Atheistic evolution has no reply to offer. Theism 
offers the only adequate solution. 

5. Nor can naturalistic evolution give a rational basis 
for the following outstanding and dominating facts in 
the present status of the cosmos : Sentiency, conscious- 
ness, freedom, morality and spirituality. Think of it 
for a moment. If there is nothing but material sub- 
stance and blind force in the world, could sentiency 
have evolved from purely non-sentient substance? 
Could the conscious have evolved from the non- 
conscious, the moral from the non-moral, the free from 
the necessitated, the spiritual from the non-spiritual, 
the idea of a personal God from mere material atoms, 
molecules and electrical forces? That would be a case 
of getting something from nothing. Again we insist on 
the basal truth: Ex nihilo nihil fit. The difficulty with 
evolution is, it fails at all the strategic and crucial points, 
the very places where it is most needed and where it 
should speak most plainly. Anybody, even a child, can 
see that an oak evolves from an acorn; but we need 
just one instance showing that mind has evolved from 
material substance, or protoplasm from dead matter. 

6. While there is considerable evidence in the geolog- 
ical ages of progress from lower to higher forms of life, 
there is also clear evidence of immense, unbridged gaps 
among many types, and there is no definite proof in either 
the past or the present of the transmutation of one 



Naturalistic Evolution 111 

species into another by an evolutionary process. Rather, 
persistency of type seems to be the dominating law. 
Think of this for a moment : If evolution were the all- 
controlling law, the law that is to account for every- 
thing in the world, would it not be seen at work today 
in all its glory and force, developing matter into life, 
transmuting species into higher forms, and evolving mon- 
keys into men? Instead of showing its power today, 
however, it seems to have become inoperative, and we see 
another law, that of the persistency of type, in the sad- 
dle. We should like to ask why evolution resigned its 
position. 

7. Again, evolution has left too many missing links. 
Everywhere there are great, deep and wide gulfs that 
have not been bridged. If evolution is the oligarch of 
the cosmos, and if these missing links ever existed, they 
should be at least fairly abundant in the fossil and other 
remains of the earth. There are many other such re- 
mains. Why do the missing links alone decline to appear ? 
To say that they will doubtless yet be discovered is to 
admit that evolution is still an unproved hypothesis. 

Note the gulf between man and the simian tribes. 
If man was evolved by a slow and gradual process from 
the monkey or chimpanzee, there must have been myriads 
of intermediate creatures once living upon the earth. 
Why has not one indisputable specimen been found? 
Should it be said that calcareous conditions are the only 
ones favorable to the preservation of fossils, and that 
at the time of the advent of the higher animal forms 
such conditions did not prevail, we reply: But the re- 
mains of many kinds of animals of comparatively recent 
times have been found, some of them of immense size. 



112 A System of Natural Theism 

Why, then, should not at least a few of the "missing 
links" appear? The only explanation that seems to be 
reasonable is that they do not exist and never have 
existed. 

8. Since historic times began, there is no evidence of 
progress in nature by its simple, native forces. All 
natural objects simply reproduce their kind, thrive for a 
while, then perish, in a ceaseless round. Only where 
man touches nature is there progress ; and even then, as 
soon as he remoyes his guiding hand, the cultured types 
revert invariably to their original wild and inferior 
forms. Man is the only being who makes progress, 
and this he does solely by the force of mind. Yet even 
the progress of the human family has been anything 
but steady, as will appear in the next section. 

9. Evolution has not been proved by the history of 
the human family; rather, it has been disproved. Many 
of the best and noblest representatives of the race ap- 
peared too soon for the theory: for example, Abraham, 
Moses, Christ ; among the heathen, Socrates, Plato, Aris- 
totle, Phidias, Homer, Sophocles, Cicero, Seneca, Marcus 
Aurelius, and many more. All these should have accom- 
modatingly waited till our present day of progress and 
civilization, or, better still, till some golden time in the 
future. Most of the nations had a high degree of civili- 
zation long before historic times began, as is evidenced 
by their archeological remains. The code of Hammu- 
rabi, formulated in the time of Abraham, disproves the 
theory of evolution. The law of Moses broke in cen- 
turies too soon for the comfort of our theorists. The 
further back you trace most of the ethnic religions, the 
purer they become both in principle and form. On the 



Naturalistic Evolution 113 

other hand, the law of degeneration rather than of evo- 
lution marks the history of many of the nations. How 
many great nations have arisen, flourished for a time, 
and perished! Today, after all the millenniums of so- 
called evolutionary progress, there are many tribes which 
are as low in the scale of civilization as any historic 
primitive people can be proved to have been. That fact 
gives the theory of evolution a serious, if not a fatal, 
blow. Moreover, the evolutionists have been challenged 
again and again to cite a single example of a nation that 
has arisen out of fetichism to monotheism by its own 
native forces — that is, without help from nations already 
highly civilized.^ All these facts disprove the much- 
vaunted theory of evolution. 

lo. On a priori principles this hypothesis cannot 
be adequate. After all, evolution is only a law, only a 
modus operandi. Therefore, it is not a power, not an 
executor. No law can enforce itself. There must be a 
law -giver and an administrant, or no law could ever have 
originated, or, if originated, could have become operative. 
It is idle to speak of "the reign of law" without positing 
a law-maker and executor. An impersonal law that can 
administer and execute itself is an absurdity. 

Thus, naturalistic evolution has been proved inade- 
quate, and therefore unscientific and unphilosophic. It 
is contradictory to its own fundamental and basal prin- 
ciple, namely, that nothing can be evolved that has not 
been previously involved by forces that are adequate. 

2. Principal Fairbairn says: "They assume a theory of development 
which has not a single historical instance to verify it. Examples are 
wanted of people who have grown, without foreign influence, from Atheism 
into Fetichism, and from it through the intermediate stages into Mono- 
theism; and until such examples be given, hypotheses claiming to be 
'Natural Histories of Religion' must be judged as hypotheses still." — 
"Studies in the Philosophy of Religion," p. 12. 



114 A System of Natural Theism 

III. THE TRUE VIEW 

We regard the following as a statement of the only- 
view that is adequate to the whole situation, and there- 
fore the view of Scientific Theism : God is the Creator, 
Preserver and Evolver. First, He created the primor- 
dial material. Without losing His transcendence, He 
became immanent in His creation, developing it through 
secondary causes for doubtless long eras ; at certain cru- 
cial steps, as was necessary. He added new creations and 
injected new forces; such epochs were the introduction 
of life, sentiency and man. This world-view should be 
called creation and evolution, with as marked an em- 
phasis on the former as on the latter. 

So far as regards the supernatural revelations made 
in the history of redemption, as recorded in the Old and 
New testaments, that thesis belongs to Christian Theism, 
not to the department of Natural Theism.^ 

3. The author desires to say that he does not oppose what is 
known as theistic evolution in the interest of Natural Theism. If 
evolution should finally be proven^ by science to be true, it would 
demand a personal God both to initiate and direct the marvellous 
upward movement. To say that mere materiality and chance could do 
this, would be to believe in a miracle so great as to be preposterous. 
The only question, therefore, is this: Has the theory of evolution 
been scientifically established, or has it not? As stated in the text, 
the author's honest conviction is that, in the present state of scien- 
tific investigation and induction, the most reasonable view is expressed 
by using two terms, instead of only one, to account for the cosmos — 
creation and evolution. 



CHAPTER XIII 

AGNOSTICISM, POSITIVISM AND MONISM 
I 

AGNOSTICISM^ 

I. DEFINITION 

Agnosticism is the hypothesis that we do not and can- 
not know whether there is a God or not. 

The word is derived from a, not, and yvwo-nKos, 
knowing. 

II. ERRORS 

1. It is contrary to the universal beliefs, intuitions 
and religious instincts o£ mankind. If we cannot 
know whether there is a God or not, why is the beHef in 
God so persistent, dominating and widespread? Agnos- 
ticism has no answer to this pregnant question. 

2. It is opposed to Christian experience wherever 
it has been honestly and earnestly tried. 

3. Agnosticism is never true to its name — that is, 
never truly agnostical: it is always assertive and dog- 
matic in setting forth its claims, instead of being modest 
and humble, as its self -chosen name would imply. To be 
true to its principles and name, it ought not even to 
assert categorically that it does not know whether there 

I. See an excellent discussion in Sheldon^ "Unbelief in the Nineteenth 
Century," pp. 96-134; Orr, ut supra, is also profound, pp. 47-51, 80-86, 
367. 373. 

115 



116 A System of Natural Theism 

is a God or not, for how can it be sure it does not know ? 
Thus it is driven around and around in a circle. How- 
ever, to be entirely fair with it, so far as regards Theism, 
it simply asserts that we do not at present have sufficient 
evidence to prove or disprove the existence of God as 
the power that created and controls the universe. 

4. In its Spencerian form, it is quite assertive on 
this point : it calls the power back of and in the universe 
the Inscrutable Power, and then immediately proceeds 
to predicate of it many attributes that can belong only 
to the God of Theism. This procedure is inconsistent 
with the fundamental position of Agnosticism. If it 
knows that the Inscrutable Power is possessed of so 
many personal attributes, how can it call itself by its self- 
chosen name? And why can it not know just a little 
more — that the Power that possesses those personal 
attributes is and must be a Person? 

5. It is narrow and one-sided in thinking that what 
cannot be proved by purely logical processes and physical 
demonstration cannot be proved at all. Many things 
are known by direct intuition and experience. Nobody 
but a misty speculatist tries to prove mathematical axioms 
by a discursive process, nor the categories of time, space 
and causality. These are known only by direct intui- 
tion. In the end, the only positive and satisfying proof 
of anything is experience. 

6. Agnosticism gives up the theistic problem too 
soon. More penetrating and patient thought and re- 
search would lead the thinker to the conclusion, taking 
all the facts into honest consideration, that the only ade- 
quate explanation of the cosmos is that of Theism. 
Agnosticism is a mark of the collapse of thought. 



Agnosticism, Positivism and Monism 117 

7. Like the other anti-theistic theories, Agnosticism 
affords no comfort, hope and moral inspiration. 

"Knownothingism" is, by its very nature, mentally and 
morally depleting. 



II 

POSITIVISM^ 

I. DEFINITIONS 

1. As a philosophy: 

As an attempt at a philosophy, Positivism is the theory 
that all we can know is phenomena, and hence we know 
nothing of noumena — that is, the essence of things. It 
professes to deal only with the things which are known; 
hence its name Positivism. In regard to God, the soul 
and the substance of matter, it is agnostic. 

2. As a religion: 

As a religion it deifies and worships "Humanity," and 
has a considerable cultus of forms and ceremonies largely 
borrowed from the Roman Catholic Church. (The 
founder of this system both in philosophy and religion 
was Auguste Comte.) 

II. ERRORS 

1. Philosophical: 

It goes too far in negating all knozvledge of noumena, 
for we do know that they must exist, or there would be 

2. Literature: Wordsworth, "The One Religion," pp. 307-309; Balfour, 
"Religion of Humanity;" Sheldon, ut supra, pp. 78-95; Lindsay, as above, 
see index; Muir, "Modern Substitutes for Christianity," pp. 93-123. 



118 A System of Natural Theism 

no basis for the phenomena which we observe. We also 
feel rationally assured that the noumena must correspond 
with the phenomena^ or the latter would not be what they 
are; they might as well be something else. If this is not 
true, the universal experiences and intuitions of mankind 
are worthless, and the world is not a rational and con- 
sistent system. 

Under the theses of Cosmology and Idealism we have 
already dwelt sufficiently on these points. However, in 
the interest of thoroughness, these distinctions should 
be made : The phenomenalism of Kant held that we do 
not know what the true character of the noumena are, 
but it did not deny their reality. Idealism denies the 
reality of the noumena, and says they are merely "forms 
of thought." Positivism simply gives up the whole ques- 
tion, and says we know nothing about the essence of 
things, and it is vain to try to know. 

2. Religious : 

As a religion. Positivism is irrational and valueless, 
because "Humanity" is simply a collective abstraction, 
and therefore no real religious communion with it is pos- 
sible. Could "Humanity" answer one's prayers? Re- 
member, the "Humanity" of this religion is not the really 
existent souls of the dead, but only the memory and influ- 
ence of their deeds as recorded in history. Such post- 
mortem influence has its inspirational value, for "their 
works do follow them" (Rev. 14:13), and "he, being 
dead, yet speaketh" (Heb. 11:4); but it is not something 
which men can consistently worship, or with which they 
can have personal communion. The religion of this cult 
does not naturally grow out of its philosophy, but is a 
mechanical attachment. The religion was an after- 



Agnosticism, Positivism and Monism 119 

thought with Comte, who reaHzed that human nature 
craves and needs religion. 



Ill 

MONISM 



I. DEFINITION 



Monism is the theory that there is only one substance. 
The word is derived from [jl6vo<s, one. 

II. EXPLANATIONS 

1. The several classes: 

(i) Materialism is monistic; it asserts that the only 
entity is material substance. Ernest Hseckel is a mat<*- 
rialistic monist. 

(2) Idealism is monistic, asserting that mind is the 
only entity. Berkeley was an idealistic monist; so is 
Snowden today. 

(3) Spinoza's Pantheism was monistic, for he re- 
duced everything to one substance, to which he assigned 
the two attributes of thought and extension. 

2. The antithesis of Monism: 

Its opposite is Dualism, which is the theistic concep- 
tion ; that is, it believes in the reality of two substances, 
mind and matter, which, while never confused or consub- 
stantiated, are nevertheless vitally connected in the 
unitary plan of the cosmos. 

Dualism holds firmly to the distinction between God 
and the cosmos, and believes in the reality of both. 
While it holds that they are distinct, and are never iden- 



120 A System of Natural Theism 

tified as in Pantheism, it maintains that God is not only- 
transcendent, but also immanent. 

Let us now state precisely the view of Natural Theism 
as developed in this work: Before the creation of the 
universe there was monism, for God was the only being, 
the only entity; since the creation of the universe there 
is dualism, for God created material substance ex nihilo, 
and gave it real being, but never mingled it with His 
own essence. He also created mental substance in mak- 
ing the human mind, but this substance is similar to His 
own essence ; that is, it is psychical essence, not material ; 
but it is not the same essence as the divine. As the 
Greeks put it, God's essence and man's psuche are homoi- 
ousios, not homooiisios — similar, but not the same. 

in. ERROR OF MONISM 

It is not necessary to expatiate on this thesis. We 
have already shown that it cannot be maintained in any 
of its forms^— Materialism, Idealism, or Pantheism. Its 
fundamental error is that it attempts the rationally im- 
possible — the reduction of two such different categories 
as matter and mind into one substance. Matter may be 
thought of, and is organically related to mind in man's 
being, but it can never be converted into mind ; nor can 
mind ever be reduced to material substance. 

The great argument for Theism is that, by positing the 
Divine Mind first as the eternal and self-existent essence, 
we assign an adequate cause for the cosmos itself and all 
cosmical phenomena and processes. It is much more 
rational to believe that mind produced matter than that 
matter brought forth mind. The cause must always be 
greater than the effect. To our way of thinking, this 



Agnosticism, Positivism and Monism 121 

is not only the most rational explanation of the universe, 
but the only rational one. 

We think this is as far as reason can go in pursuing 
the theistic argument. It may not convince the intellect 
of every thinker. Then conscience constrains us to add 
that the final and absolute certitude can be gained only 
by the experience of God in the soul. 



PART IV 

THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES AND RELATIONS 

CHAPTER XIV 

THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 

I. DEFINITION 

A divine attribute is a quality or perfection that belongs 
inherently to the being of God. It is not an entity or 
quiddity, but a characteristic or condition of being, as we 
say virtue is an attribute of man. 

II. RATIONALE 

There are two ways by which Natural Theism deter- 
mines the divine attributes : First, from their manifesta- 
tions in the cosmos, including nature and man; second, 
from the processes of reason. However, in treating the 
subject these two methods are combined. In Christian 
Theism the divine attributes can be more fully treated, 
because that branch of scientific theology works in the 
light of God's special revelation of Himself to man. For 
example, the love of God is most clearly and impressively 
displayed in the plan of redemption, but mere human 
reason, without revelation, can say little or nothing rela- 
tive to that locus. What do nature and reason tell us 
about God's perfections? 

122 



The Divine Attributes 123 

III. CLASSES OF ATTRIBUTES 

1. Self-existence: 

By this attribute is meant that God has the ground and 
basis of His being in Himself alone. While this may be 
a difficult conception to some minds, yet reason teaches 
that the ultimate Being must be possessed inherently of 
this quaHty. As has been shown in former theses, some- 
thing exists now — a self-evident proposition; therefore 
something must have always existed; for if there had 
ever been a time when there was nothing, nothing could 
have ever been. Now, it is obvious that what has always 
existed could not have been produced by something else 
and could not be dependent for its existence on some- 
thing other than itself ; therefore, the source and ground 
of its being must be within itself. However, we have 
already shown by all the theistic arguments that the 
only adequate cause of the universe is a personal Being 
whom we call God. Thus, reason demands self-exist- 
ence as a necessary divine attribute. 

2. Eternity : 

By this attribute we mean that God has always been 
and alv/ays will be. The rational basis for this attribute 
is the same as that which proves self-existence. There 
must have always been something, or nothing could have 
ever come into being. But the cosmos demands a per- 
sonal Being as its Primal Cause ; therefore, God must be 
an eternal Being. 

3. Personality : 

(i) Definition: By personality we mean that God is 
a Being who can say 'T." He is the eternal and absolute 



124 A System of Natural Theism 

Ego who knows, thinks and wills. He is the eternally 
self-conscious Being. 

(2) Argumentation: The Teleological Argument 
proves God to be Personal, because the design which is 
so palpable in the universe in its entirety and in all its 
parts connotes a Designer who is intelligent and free; 
but such a Being must be a person. The Cosmological 
Argument verifies God's personality, for there are per- 
sons in the cosmos, namely, human beings, and the only 
adequate ground for such personalities is a Person who 
brought them into existence; the non-personal never 
could have evolved the personal. The Moral and Esthet- 
ical arguments postulate a personal God, for morality can 
be predicated only of persons and the beautiful can be 
truly appreciated only by persons. The Ontological Ar- 
gument leads to the same conclusion ; for the perfect and 
absolute Being could not be perfect and absolute without 
personality, since personality is one of the highest attri- 
butes conceivable. Speculative philosophers like Hegel, 
Fichte, Schelling and Von Hartmann, who talk about 
"Unconscious Intelligence" and "Unconscious Will," are 
using contradictory terms. If God is intelHgent and free, 
He must be a Person. 

At this point, in the interest of thoroughness, we must 
notice the view, set forth by a certain class of speculatists, 
that God is not personal, but super personal. Herbert 
Spencer seemed to hold this opinion, or something akin 
to it, for he says : It is an "erroneous assumption that 
the choice is between personality and something lower 
than personality, whereas the choice is rather between 
personality and something higher."^ One cannot help 

1. "First Principles," page 109. 



The Divine Attributes 125 

wondering what kind of a being that would be which was 
"something higher" than a self-conscious, rational, free 
and moral personality. If there is such a being, we 
evidently can have no conception of it. Certainly the 
''Inscrutable Power," which Mr. Spencer wishes to substi- 
tute for a personal God as the ultimate ground and cause 
of the universe, is not "something higher" than a person, 
but, rather, something lower ; for Mr. Spencer studiously 
avoids attributing self -consciousness to it. We leave it 
to common sense : Which is the higher kind of being, one 
that has, or one that has not, the attribute of self-con- 
sciousness, the ability to say "I"? 

An advocate of the view that God is superpersonal is 
Dr. Paul Carus, who, in a recent book,^ says of God : "He 
is not personal, but superpersonal. He is not a great man, 
he is God. He is the life of our life ; he is the power that 
sustains the universe ; he is the law that permeates all ; he 
is the curse of sin and the blessing of righteousness ; he is 
the unity of being; he is love; he is the possibility of 
science and the truth of knowledge ; he is light ; he is the 
reality of existence in which we live and move and have 
our being; he is life and the condition of life, morality. 
To comprehend all in a word, he is the authority of 
conduct." 

Such dogmatic statements, given without argument or 
proof, need little refutation. What is there about them to 
prove that God is superpersonal? They are just as true if 
we conceive of God as a personal being; indeed, they 
comport much better with that idea. "He is the curse of 
sin and the blessing of righteousness." How can He be 
that without being a self-conscious and rational being? 

2. "The Dawn of a New Religious Era" (1916), page 25. 



126 A System of Natural Theism 

"He is love." Can a being love without self-conscious 
personality ? "He is the authority of conduct," How can 
there be moral authority worthy of the name without 
rational personality ? Either this author's statements con- 
note personality in God, which is a clear conception, or 
else they are a lot of abstractions of which no human mind 
can form a definite idea. We still maintain that reason 
must and does conclude that the highest and noblest 
attribute of any being is self-conscious, rational personal- 
ity, and any being devoid of that quality ranks lower in 
the scale. 

4. Spirituality : 

This means that God's essence is spirit or mind, not 
matter. We have already vindicated the doctrine of 
Dualism. There are two kinds of "stuff" in existence : 
mind and matter. They belong to different categories, 
and therefore cannot be merged into one substance, as is 
done by Monism and Pantheism. Matter is subject to 
purely mechanical laws, and is inert and unfree. Mind 
has very different qualities; it is self-conscious, self- 
determining, moral and spiritual. Therefore, Dualism is 
the only adequate philosophy. 

But mind is greater than matter ; a quiddity of a nobler 
quality; therefore, matter never could have produced or 
evolved mind. The only rational and adequate hypothe- 
sis is that mind was first. Therefore, the ultimate Cause 
of the universe was the eternal, self -existent, personal 
Mind. 

5. Unity: 

By this attribute we mean that God is one God and the 
only one of His kind. In scholastic phrase, He is untis 



The Divine Attributes 127 

et unicus — that is, one and unique. He is sui generis, 
in a genus of His own, in a class by Himself. 

The oneness of God is proved rationally in several 
ways. The universe (iinus, one, and vertere, versum, to 
turn) displays such wonderful unity of plan and opera- 
tion that the only rational conclusion is that it is the 
product of one omniscient Mind. It would be idle to 
suppose that it was produced by two or more minds when 
its solidarity of plan is better explained on the principle 
of unity. Again, God is infinite; there can be only one 
Infinite. God is absolute ; there can be only one Absolute. 
God is independent; there can be only one Independent 
Being. God is self-existent ; there can be only one such a 
Being. 

6. Infinity : 

(i) Definition. 

By infinity is meant that God is without boundary or 
limitation of any kind. Some thinkers add the qualify- 
ing phrase : "except those that belong to the perfection 
of His own character." By this modification they mean, 
for example, that God cannot do wrong, for, if He could, 
it would mean that He is not a perfect Being. However, 
difficult as the conception may be, the author is disposed 
to think that God is not limited in the way indicated; 
it would not be correct to say, "God cannot do wrong." 
We would rather put it thus : God is so perfect and 
absolute in His moral character that He will not do 
wrong. We would not even put a limit on the moral 
freedom of God. However, in so difficult a matter of 
metaphysics there is room for honest difference of 
opinion. 



128 A System of Natural Theism 

As to the conception of spatial infinity, no one can 
understand it. In reality we cannot conceive of infinite 
space, and yet we cannot conceive of a line or point 
where space stops. Our minds are so formed that we 
always think in the categories of time and space, and 
cannot think otherwise. So we cannot in our present 
state of knowledge formulate a definite idea of infinity 
and eternity, and should be honest enough to admit our 
ignorance and inability. However, this is no reason for 
rejecting our necessary idea of the reality of these things, 
for, though we know there are time and space, no one 
can define them. What is time ? What is space ? These 
are still two of the unsolved problems of speculative 
philosophy. All we can say is that the ideas of time 
and space are necessary ideas, and so are the ideas of 
eternity and infinity. 

(2) Infinite divine attributes: 

a. Omniscience: God is all-wise. For the argument, 
see Chapter IV, Section 5 (3). 

b. Omnipotence: God is all-powerful. For the argu- 
ment, see Chapter IV, Section 5 (2). 

c. Omnipresence: God is everywhere present. If He 
were not present everywhere, something would occur in 
some part of His universe that would throw it out of 
accord and balance, and that would precipitate universal 
wreckage, and would perhaps involve God's own ruin. 
The personal presence of God in every place and in all 
places is beyond human comprehension, and yet reason 
requires this view of His personal ubiquity for the preser- 
vation of Himself and His universe. 



The Divine Attributes 129 

7. Justice : 

This attribute signifies that God hates sin and wrong, 
and will punish them condignly. The Moral Argument 
would connote this fact, for if God is a moral Being, the 
attribute of perfect justice must pertain to Him. 

8. Goodness : 

This means that God is loving, beneficent, kind, desir- 
ing the highest well-being of all His creatures. 

Skeptical and pessimistic philosophers have so often 
called the goodness of God in question, and have argued 
the subject so elaborately, that, in order to deal with it 
with any degree of adequacy, we must devote an entire 
chapter to its presentation. The time given to it will not 
be spent in vain, for the mentally and morally depleting 
influence of pessimism is evident on every hand today. 



CHAPTER XV 

THESIS ON god's GOODNESS^ 

I. WHY A SPECIAL THESIS 

The goodness of God has been so frequently assailed 
by agnostics, atheists and pessimists that the Theist today 
must meet the difficulties frankly and vindicate the divine 
character with sound argument. Mere abuse will not 
answer the objections of the skeptic or satisfy the honest 
doubts of the inquirer. An unbiased investigation of the 
cosmos as it actually is will reveal the fact that there 
are real difficulties. Let us examine them. 

II. DIFFICULTIES FRANKLY STATED 

1. Organisms are often imperfect; many of them 
are apparently of a low order and crudely contrived; 
they are frequently deficient in strength, even for the 
purpose for which they were intended; and all of them 
are liable to derangement, and will finally wear out and 
cease to function. Even the eye, admirable a piece of 
mechanism as it is, has often been criticized by eminent 
anatomists for its apparent imperfections. 

2. Organisms seldom, if ever, seem to be perfectly 
adapted to their environments. On account of their 
imperfect functioning, they bring on many distressing 

I. Valentine's "Natural Theology," (pp. 231-251) is especially fair and 
judical on this topic, and the author is glad to acknowledge his indebted- 
ness to that work. Consult also Orr, "The Christian View," etc., pp. 186-199. 

130 



Thesis on God's Goodness 131 

diseases, especially in the human body. Animal organ- 
isms are not so susceptible to disease; yet even they 
may become ineffective and painful through accident. 
Thus nature sometimes appears to defeat her own pur- 
poses. 

3. The earth in many ways does not seem to us to 
be the best possible: there are large zones of torrid 
heat and frigid cold, where life is very difficult and in 
some cases impossible. There are also large areas of 
sterility, as the desert of Sahara, and many dank, noi- 
some, miasmatic swamps. 

4. A serious difficulty is the large amount of animal 
suffering in the world, due to the constitution of na- 
ture herself. The carnivorous species seem to be designed 
by nature for catching, holding, slaying and devouring 
their victims. Note the talons and beaks of the owls, hawks 
and eagles, and the claws of all the felines. These in- 
struments are just as highly specialized for their purpose 
as the eye is for sight and the ear for sound. ^ 

5. There is much unavoidable human suffering in 
the world. The innocent often suffer with the guilty, 
as in the case of storm, flood and war. The same is 
true of the many diseases to which human beings are 
subject. Sooner or later, too, death overtakes all men. 

On account of these difficulties many persons, look- 
ing only on the surface of things and making mere 
pleasure the summum honiim of life, have turned athe- 
istic. The theist as well as the atheist is cognizant of 
these difficultes, and has often been puzzled by them. 

2. J. S. Mill, in his "Three Essays," makes a terrific indictment of 
nature on the score of her apparent cruelty. Naville, in "De Maistre," is 
only a little less severe. Tennyson, "In Memoriam," gives us the gory 
phrase, "nature red in tooth and claw." 



132 A System of Natural Theism 

While it is no mark of depth of thought to recognize 
them, for even the child is often troubled by their pres- 
ence and prevalence, yet we must deal with them frankly, 
and must not close our eyes to the facts. So we turn 
to the positive side of the problem. 

III. MITIGATING EXPLANATIONS 

1. Why we cannot explain away all the dif- 
ficulties : 

(i) We can explain nothing fully — time, space, 
cause, effect, matter, mind; therefore our inability here 
is no exception to the rule. 

(2) If we could explain these difficulties perfectly, 
we could do the same with all our other problems; 
then where would there be any room for faith? Yet 
how many things must be taken on faith in this world! 
In how many ways we must trust nature and our fel- 
lowmen! All this proves that the present regimen 
is evidently intended to develop and discipline our 
faith. 

(3) Sin has come into the world. This is not a mat- 
ter of speculation. Whether we are Christians or 
not, we must admit the presence and fact of sin, for our 
consciences attest it. This fact will help to account for 
the disarranged natural order for the present age or 
dispensation, and also why the intellect of man has 
become obscured. 

2. There may he divine goodness and wisdom even 
where they are not perfectly plain to our beclouded fac- 
ulties. God may simply be moving "in a mysterious 
way His wonders to perform." 

3. We are finite and the world is subject to finity. 



Thesis on God's Goodness 133 

So far as we can see in the present order, however it 
may be by and by, finiteness implies imperfection. 

4. Being the creatures of time ayid very greatly 
limited in our powers, we may see only a part of God's 
eternal plan. Perhaps when we come to see His whole 
order and purpose, we shall acclaim His infinite benefi- 
cence. Is it not better and braver to think in this hope- 
ful way than to abandon ourselves to despondency and 
cynicism ? 

5. The doctrine of development and the survival of 
the fittest, if it is the true theory, proves a progressive 
order moving toward a benign end. Those who accept 
this doctrine ought not, therefore, to relinquish belief 
in God and His goodness, for there could be no such 
beneficent movement if there were no purposeful 
mind to inaugurate it and carry it to the desired 
end. 

6. The vast majority of nature's contrivances and 
adaptations are beneficial. If this were not so, the fit- 
test could not survive, and, indeed, the whole world 
would speed to ruin. There is a balance on the side 
of wisdom, kindliness and order, or the world could not 
continue. A majority on the side of chaos would have 
wrought havoc long ere this. 

7. Animal tragedies may be explained by the fol- 
lowing alleviating circumstances : 

(i) There is more pleasure than pain in the sentient 
realm. Any one who is a student of nature is im- 
pressed with the general air of joy that nature and all 
her creatures wear. As a rule, nature is less cruel 
than man. With possibly an exception or two, there is 
no evidence that animals torture each other. That sort 



134 A System of Natural Theism 

of wantonness and vindictiveness seems to be left to 
man. Even the cat playing with the mouse perhaps 
does not intend to torture its victim, but simply to grati- 
fying its playful disposition. 

(2) Death makes room for more animals, and thus 
the sum total of sentient happiness is increased; for, if 
all survived, the world would soon be over-crowded. 

(3) Speedy death is the general order in the animal 
world, and that is the most merciful regimen that could 
have been devised, providing death could not be entirely 
avoided. Suppose that a slow and lingering death were 
the usual order in the animal creation, how much greater 
would be the amount of suffering! 

(4) Perhaps many animals are not extremely sensi- 
tive to pain. At least, such is the belief of many of the 
most eminent naturalists.^ Wounded animals soon fall 
into a kind of stupor, as if nature herself provided an 
anesthetic for her sentient children. Nor do animals 
have clear ideas of death, such as men entertain; and 
they certainly are not troubled with any fear of what 
may come after death. 

(5) Here we offer a view that we have not seen sug- 
gested by writers on Theism. Personally we have so 
much faith in the wisdom and goodness of God who was 
able to make this wonderful universe as to believe that, 
in some way and at some time. He will mete out equal 
justice to all his sentient creatures which have ever suf- 
fered unjustly. While we have no oracular declaration 
to make, nor even an absolute conviction to express, we 
agree with a recent writer* that if God shall see fit to 

3. See Mivart, "Lessons from Nature," pp. 368, 369, cited by Orr, 

4. William Hayes Ward in "What I Believe and Why." 



Thesis on God's Goodness 135 

bestow immortality on the best part of His animal world, 
we shall at least find no reason to object to His plan. 
By so doing He might sometime make every wrong right 
even in the animal world. There is some hint of this 
doctrine in the Bible, which speaks of a millennial age 
when "the wolf shall dwell with the lamb, and the leop- 
ard shall lie down with the kid; and the calf and the 
young lion together, and a little child shall lead them. 
And the cow and the bear shall feed : their young shall 
lie down together; and the lion shall eat straw like the 
ox. * * * They shall not hurt nor destroy in all 
my holy mountain; for the earth shall be full of the 
knowledge of Jehovah, as the waters cover the sea" 
(Isa. 11:6-9). 

8. It should be remembered that pain is nowhere in 
nature ordained for its own sake, but is an incident along 
the way of progress. This may be an index that the ul- 
terior purpose of pain is disciplinary. 

9. In the human world pain has its uses; 

(i) It heightens pleasure by contrast. 

(2) It warns us of peril, and thus helps to preserve 
health and life. 

(3) It leads to careful study and observance of 
nature's laws. 

(4) It stimulates men to exertion, invention and 
initiative. 

(5) It develops the noble virtue of patience and 
its cognate virtues. 

10. Hardship discipHnes men in strength and stur- 
diness; without it they would be weak physically and 
inane morally. 



136 A System of Natural Theism 

11. Danger develops courage. How else could the 
heroic virtues be cultivated? Is it better to have supine 
beings, or beings who are morally noble, strong and 
brave ? 

12. Mystery in the world and in human experience 
calls out the noble virtue of trust in God. If we could 
understand all things, there would be no opportunity 
for the exercise and development of this virtue. Where, 
then, would be the heroes of faith in a world without 
trial and mystery? In general it may be said that the 
world cannot be explained without taking into considera- 
tion moral values ; and since we know, as has been seen 
in the Moral Argument, that this world is a moral 
economy, the person who tries to explain it merely as a 
utilitarian and pleasure-giving administration will be 
balked at every step, and will ultimately land in pessi- 
mism. However, if moral excellence is the highest ex- 
cellence, we can see that a world of trial and mystery 
is the best regimen in which to acquire moral discipline; 
indeed, how could true moral character be attained with- 
out moral testing? Therefore, whatever else may be said 
of the present regime, it is precisely adapted for the 
highest moral purposes. For the epicurean and hedonist 
it is not a satisfactory world; but the true and sturdy 
ethicist, who values moral achievement above mere pleas- 
ure, has no reason for complaint.^ Thus, respecting 
the problem of God's goodness in view of the present 
order of the world, men should not permit themselves 
to fall into pessimism. This leads us to our next 
division. 

5. Most searching is Sheldon, "Unbelief in the Nineteenth Century," 
PP- 135-149; also Orr, "The Christian View," etc., pp. 51-57. 66-72, 167-170, 
186, 321, 401, 467. 



Thesis on God's Goodness 137 

IV. CONTRAST BETWEEN PESSIMISM AND 
OPTIMISM 

1. Characteristics of pessimism: 

(i) It exaggerates the evil and overlooks or mini- 
mizes the good in the world. 

(2) It cares only for temporal and sensuous good, 
for the pleasurable, and fails to appreciate moral, spirit- 
ual and eternal values. It is blind to the moral use of 
discipline and hard tasks. 

(3) It becomes daunted in the presence of difficult- 
ies instead of bravely trying to surmount them and find 
exhilaration in the effort. 

(4) It means the eclipse of faith, hope and love — 
that splendid triumvirate of virtues. 

(5) It is another name for moral flabbiness. It 
is given to complaint; it grows more and more cynical. 
It gives up to ennui, becomes blase. Instead of plow- 
ing up the weeds in its garden, mellowing and fertilizing 
the soil, and sowing useful seeds, it sits down and moans 
because nature or nature's God permits weeds to grow. 
It looks upon the world as a lapse and misfortune; an 
economy of sorrow and evil. Schopenhauer said : "This 
is the worst possible world." Von Hartmann was not 
willing to go quite so far, but his view was doleful 
enough: 'Tf this is not the worst world, it is at least 
worse than none." 

2. Characteristics of rational optimism: 

(i) It recognises the evils of the world both as 
reality and evil. The optimism that fails to do this, 
or that calls the evil good, is not rational, but Utopian and 
flighty. 



138 A System of Natural Theism 

(2) However, rational optimism sees and cherishes 
the good in the world, and believes that it predominates. 

(3) In so far from spending valuable time in bemoan- 
ing the evil, and speculating about its cause, it seeks 
to mitigate and reduce it, and make the good triumphant. 

(4) It sees in the world just as it is an arena for 
manly conflict and a school for the discipline and devel- 
opment of all the sterling and heroic virtues. 

(5) It trusts in God and the good, and is sure of ulti- 
mate victory. It never knows defeat. It is sustained 
by faith, hope and love. Its chief refrains are the fol- 
lowing : "All things work together for good to them that 
love God" (Rom. 8:28). "Our light affliction, which 
is but for the moment, worketh for us a far more exceed- 
ing and eternal weight of glory" (2 Cor. 4:17). It takes 
to itself the inspiration of William Cowper's impressive 
hymn : 

"God moves in a mysterious way 

His wonders to perform ; 
He plants His footsteps on the sea, 

And rides upon the storm. 

"Deep in unfathomable mines 

Of never- failing skill, 
He treasures up His bright designs. 

And works His sovereign will. 

"Judge not the Lord by feeble sense. 

But trust Him for His grace ; 
Behind a frowning providence 

He hides a smiHng face." 



Thesis on God's Goodness 139 

(6) Therefore, to sum it all up, rational optimism 
believes in the infinite goodness of God, holding that He 
seeth high and wise; that He knows the end from the 
beginning, and so cannot be balked in His plans; that 
He does all things well; that He has made the universe 
friendly, even though we cannot always understand His 
ways ; that He will "bring good out of evil and make the 
wrath of man to praise Him;" that He will ultimately 
cause right and truth to triumph over every foe. 



CHAPTER XVI 

THE DIVINE RELATIONS 

I. DEFINITION 

By the term divine relations we mean God's connection 
with the universe which He has created and which He 
sustains. 

II. CLASSIFICATION 
1. Transcendence: 

This means that God is greater than the universe. It 
is finite; He is infinite. He is distinct in His essence 
from the universe ; not, as Pantheism holds, identified or 
consubstantiated with it. On this account He is able to 
exercise perfect control over it, and preserve it from 
destruction. 

As a personal Being, God must be transcendent re- 
specting His cosmos. If He were identical with the uni- 
verse, which is non-personal, He too would be non-per- 
sonal. That God is and must be a personal Being has 
been proved by all our foregoing arguments. While we 
cannot comprehend the doctrine of the divine trans- 
cendence, we at least have an intuitive conception of it, 
and reason teaches that no other view of God and the 
world is tenable. 

140 



The Divine Relations 141 

2. Immanence : 

By this term is meant that God is present everywhere 
in His universe, and governs and cares for it according 
to the laws and principles which He has ordained. 

The proofs of God's immanence have already been 
presented and need no further elaboration. While im- 
manence may involve mystery, it is only like all the 
other mysteries that surround us. The physicist teaches 
that the universal ether is the substratum of all palpable 
substance ; yet we cannot understand its composition nor 
the forces that cause it to produce the varied phenomena 
of the material universe. So the immanence of the per- 
sonal God in the cosmos may involve an insoluble mys- 
tery for the present; yet all the processes of reasoning 
lead to the conclusion that God must be a person and 
must be personally present in every part of His universe. 



Thus, in conclusion, reason proves, so far as reason 
can prove any proposition, the fact of the divine exist- 
ence in two ways: First positively by means of the 
several arguments employed in Part H of this work; 
second, negatively by the presentation of the arguments 
which show that all anti-theistic positions are 
logically untenable. As a necessary corollary to 
the positive and negative arguments, the divine 
attributes and relations are also established by the rational 
process. The chief purpose of this book will be accom- 
plished if the student and reader have been led to real- 
ize clearly and positively that our human life, in spite 
of all its limitations, trials and mysteries, is more than 
worth while, is even great and inspiring, because "God 



142 A System of Natural Theism 

is in heaven, and all's well with the world." True, there 
may be lacunae in many a logical process; yet it is 
broadly and sanely rational to accept that doctrine which 
affords the greatest zest and incentive to the develop- 
ment of nobility of life and character; and surely such 
moral and spiritual uplift dwells most congenially with 
the theistic conception. 



INDEX 



Adaptation, 34, 39, 44, 45, 106, 130. 
Etiological Argument, 49. 
Agnosticism, 6, 7, 39, 58, 72, 74, 92, 

115-117, 130. 
Animal instinct. 37. 
Animal suffering, 131, 133-135, 
Animism, 24. 
Anselm, 59. 
Apologetics, 7. 
Aristotle, 18. 
Atheism, 6, 20, 29, 30, 74, 75, 81, 82, 

84-89, 92, 108-114, 130, 131. 
Attributes, the divine, 122-139. 

Balfour, A. J., 13, 64, 76. 

Berkeley, 119. 

Bible, the, 15, 19, 26, 32, 69, 70, 80, 

83, 90, 91, 114, 118, 122, 135, 138. 
Biology, 37, 38. 
Brahm, 29. 
Buddhism, 29. 
Butler, 60. 

Cabanis, 87. 

Carus, Paul, 125, 126. 

Causality, law of, 23, 30, 33, 39, 42, 

49-58, 63, 12, 85, 86, 89, 96, 110, 113, 

116, 120. 
Chance, 22, 39-41, 44, 46, 85. 
Chemistry and Physics, 17, 38. 
Christian Theism (Theology), 15, 

16, 19, 99, 114, 122. 
ChristHeb, Theodore, 85, 93, 94. 
Cicero, 18. 
Colleges, 5, 7. 

Comte, Auguste, ZZ, 54, 102, 117, 119. 
Conception of God, 21-27, 29. 
Conscience, 65-69, 121. 
Cosmological Argument, 49-58, 62, 

63, 64, 65, 80, 118, 124. 
Cousin, 60. 

Cowper, William, 138. 
Creation and evolution, 114. 

Degeneration, 26, 27, 113. 

Deism, 90-93. 

Dennert, 108. 

Descartes, 60. 

Design, 34-48, 78, 19, 106, 109. 

Dorner, 60. 

Dualism, 88, 100, 119, 120, 126. 

Ear, eye, etc., 35, Z(>, 41. 

Edison, 16. 

Efficient cause, 34. 

Egypt, 26. 

Epicureanism, 45, 52, 74, 136. 

Epistemology, 17, 18, 101-103, 106, 

107, 117, 118. 
Esthetical Argument, 76-83, 124. 
Ethnology ,_ 26, 28, 29, 31, 85, 86. 
Eutaxiological Argument, 34. 
Evolution, 24, 25, 30, 31, Z7>, 41, 43, 

44, 57, 70, 71, 85, 108-114, 133. 
Experience, 17, 30, 53, 58, 61, 74, 

102, 104, 115, 118, 121. 

143 



Ex nihilo nihil fit, 58, 



88, 99, 110. 



Fairbairn, A. M., 26, 113. 

Fairhurst, 108. 

Feuerbach, 87. 

Fetichism, 24, 27, 113. 

Final cause, 34. 

First cause, the, 21, 30, 44, 46, 49, 

55-57, 65, 126. 
Fisher, Geo. P., 12, 60, 85, 94. 
Flint, 12, 84. 
Freedom of the will, 69. 

Gaps unbridged by evolution, 109- 

113. 
General Argument, 28-33. 
God, absolute, 21, 31, 59-63, 97, 127. 
—beneficent, 79, 122, 129, 130-138. 
—Creator, 17, 21, 23, 33, 55-58, 70-74, 

80, 82, 85. 90, 91, 108, 114, 116. 
—eternal, 55, 56, 120, 123, 126. 
—immanent, 43, 90, 91, 94, 95, 120, 

141. 
—infinite, 21, 47, 48. 57, 93, 91, 127, 

128, 140. 
—intelligent, 21, 39-48, 85, 97, 109, 

124. 
—just, 129. 

— marks of handiwork, 17. 
—moral, 65, 66, 70-75, 82. 
—personal, 19, 20, 21, 33, 42, 46-48, 

49, 56, 57, 58, 65, 66, 70-74, 79, 

80, 85, 90, 91, 94, 97, 98, 99, 109, 

114, 116, 123-126, 140, 141. 
—self-existent, 56, 120, 123, 126, 127, 

129. 
— spiritual substance, 126, 
—supreme, 21, 31, 85. 
—transcendent, 43, 90. 91, 94, 95, 

140, 141. 
— uncaused, 55, 56. 
— unus et unicus, 25, 126, 127. 
Goodness of God, 130-139. 

Haeckel, Ernest, 33, 119. 

Hamilton, Sir William, 60. 

Handiwork, marks of God's, 17. 

Harris, Samuel, 12, 52, 60, 85. 

Hedonism, 89, 136. 

Henotheism, 24. 

Hibben, J. G., 52. 

Historical data, 18, 19, 26, 28, 29, 112. 

Home, 92. 

Humanity, religion of, 20, 117, 118. 

Hume, 39, 42, 51, 59, 91. 

Idealism, 18, 54, 94, 100-107, 118, 120. 
Illusions, 53, 102, 103, 105. 
Image of God in man, 23. 
Immortality, 88, 99, 134, 135. 
Intuitions, man's, 17, 18, 22, 23, 50, 

51-54, 61, 62, 78, 101-103, 106, 107, 

117, 118. 140. 
Introductory data, 15-27. 

Kant, 18, 51, 52, 54, 71, 72, 102, 103, 
118. 



144 



Index 



Keyser, L. S., 100. 

Legge, James, 26.- 
Leibnitz, 60. 
Leuba, J. H., S. 
Lindsay, 13, 60, 100. 

Materialism, 7, 30, 33, 44, 72, 82, 84- 

89, 94, 100, 119, 120. 
Matter and mind, 16, 87, 88, 95, 96, 

100, 119, 120, 126. 
Micou, R. W., 13, 60, 64, 76, 85, 94, 

100, 108. 
Mill, J. S., 39, 42, 51, 131. 
Missing links, 111. 
Mivart, 44, 134. 

Monism, 84, 94, 100, 119-121, 126. 
Monotheism, 25-27, 29. 113, 126, 127. 
Moral Argument, 64-75, 82, 88, 89, 

124, 136. 
Morality and Theism, 20, 74, 75. 
Moral distinctions, 20, 29, 65, 66, 67, 

68, 70, 88, 94, 98, 107. 
Moral nature, man's, 65-69. 
Moral order and economy, 69-74, 

136. 
Miiller, Max, 26. 
Mystery, 136, 137. 

National Geographical Society, 31, 

32. 
Naville, 131. 

Need of a work on Theism, 6, 7. 
Noumena, 52, 101-103, 105, 106, 117, 

118. 

Objections to Teleology confuted, 

42-46. 
Ontology, 96. 

Ontological Argument, 59-63, 124. 
Optimism, 46, 137-139. 
Organisms, 35, 36, 45, 130, 131. 
Orr, James, 12, 26, 60, 85, 94, 108, 115, 

130, 134, 136. 

Pantheism, 20, 72, 92, 94-99, 100, 119, 

120, 126, 140. 
Patterson, Alexander, 108. 
Pessimism, 46, 71, 81, 88, 129, 130, 

136, 137. 
Phenomena, 52, 101-103, 105, 106, 117, 

120. 
Philology, 25. 
Philosophy and Theism, 18, 20, 38, 

93, 95, 99, 100, 103, 104, 113, 117, 118, 

126, 128, 129. 
Plato, 42, 59. 
Polytheism, 24, 26, 27. 
Positivism, 18, 117-119. 
Psychology, 25, 38, 87, 88. 
Presumptive proofs, 28. 
Purpose of this book, 5-7, 141, 142. 

Questionaire, a, 6. 

Ramsay, F. P., 26. 



Reason, 16, 17, 22, 23, 141. 
Redemption, 122. 
Relations, divine, 122, 140-142. 
Religion and Theism, 18, 19, 20, 27, 

31-33, 98, 112, 118. 
Renouf, 26. 
Repulsive, the, 81-83. 
Revelation, divine, 15, 19, 23, 90, 122. 

Schopenhauer, 137. 

Science and Theism, 18, 20, 21, 32, 

38, 41, 51, 93. 
Seminaries, theological, 5, 7. 
Sheldon, H. C, 13, 85, 100, 108, 115, 

136. 
Sin, 32, 46, 132. 
Smith, Goldwin, 20, 75. 
Snowden, J. H., 100, 119. 
Socrates, 18. 

Spencer, Herbert, 74, 75, 116, 124, 125. 
Spinoza, 94, 95, 96, 119. 
State, the, and Theism, 20. 
Sublime, the, 83. 
Suffering, the problem of, 131, 132- 

136. 
Summum Bonum, 65, 131. 
Superpersonal, God not, 124-126. 

Teleological Argument, 34-48, 78- 

81, 124. 
Tennyson, 131. 

Theism, an adequate world-view, 

20, 23, 30, 41, 42. 51, 55, 56, 58, 

63, 72, 86, 87, 89, 104, 110, 113^ 

114, 116, 120, 121, 124, 126. 

— comforting world-view, 82, 132- 

139. 
— a morallj' uplifting world-view, 

74, 75, 82, 89, 139, 141, 142. 
— definition, IS. 
—history, 18, 19. 
— importance, 5-7. 
— other terms, 15. 
—relations, 19-21. 

Townsend, L. T., 108. 
Tribal or national gods, 24. 
Trust in God, 136, 138, 139. 

Universal beHef in God, 28-31, 85, 86, 

115. 
Universal religious instinct, 31-33, 

115. 
Unity of God, 25, 126, 127. 
Universe, the, 21, 39, 45, 46, 47, 52-58, 

64, 65, 85, 86, 95, 97, 102, 103, 104, 

120, 123, 127, 128. 134, 139, 141. 
Urquhart, John, 92. 

Valantine, Milton, 12, 17, 24, 25. 

26, 28, 38,^9, 60, 64. 
Vogt, Carl, 87. 
Von Hartmann, 124, 137. 

Ward. W. H., 13, 34. 134. 
Wright, Geo. F., 108, 109. 
Wrong, the, 72-74. 



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